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ABSTRACT
Since 1988, over five hundred formerly homeless families have
been relocated to moderate- and middle-income housing
developments in the New York metropolitan area. The program,
coined the "Involuntarily Displaced Families Program" (IDFP),
places families from New York City and Westchester County
shelters in state-regulated "Mitchell-Lama" apartments.
This study evaluates the results of the IDFP in the context of
research on family homelessness and studies of other rehousing
programs. Building on three case studies of rehoused
families, the study examines the process of resettling and of
building social supports in a new community. A content
analysis of family case records is performed to document
problems experienced by families, service interventions by
caseworkers and activities, such as work and job training, in
which families participate once in permanent housing.
The study finds that most participants are still in their
apartments on average two years after relocation. This high
level of stability among formerly homeless families is
attributable to the applicant screening process, the high
quality of Mitchell-Lama apartments and the follow-up visits
by caseworkers. However, the study also finds that families
experience numerous institutional problems such as welfare
case closings, difficulty obtaining day care, and frequent
rent arrears. Also, many families have difficulty
establishing friends and other social supports in their new
neighborhoods. These problems impede families' attempts to
settle; they make the "permanent" housing seem less permanent.
The study concludes with recommendations on ways to improve
the IDFP and build supports for families in their new
communities.
Thesis Supervisor:
Langley Carleton Keyes
Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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Introduction
Since 1988, over five hundred formerly homeless families
have been relocated to moderate- and middle-income housing
developments in the New York metropolitan area. The program,
sponsored by the New York State Division of Housing and
Community Renewal (DHCR) and the State Department of Social
Services (DSS), places families from New York City and
Westchester County shelters in state-regulated "Mitchell-Lama"
apartments.
The relocation program, coined the "Involuntarily
Displaced Families Program" (IDFP), can be thought of as a
grand social experiment: How well have formerly homeless and
very low-income families "mainstreamed" into economically
integrated housing? Are the social services provided to
families as part of the program necessary? Are they enough?
Are they the right ones? Given safe and secure housing in
relatively stable neighborhoods, have these families
experienced other lifestyle improvements (such as family
stability, leaving the welfare system, joining educational or
job training programs)? How do these results confirm or
conflict with the findings of researchers in the field of
family homelessness?
Most rehousing studies focus on recidivism: if the family
is still living in the apartment some months after relocation,
then the placement is considered a success. In this thesis, I
will look instead at the process of resettling and at the
families' quality of living in the new housing. By the
limited criteria of recidivism, the IDFP is an overwhelming
success. As many as 98 percent of the participants are still
in place two years after resettlement. A more pertinent
question, however, is whether this housing has had any effect,
positive or negative, on the family's life. If a woman
relocating with her children feels atomized in the new
development because of the scrutiny of neighbors, the lack of
friends or people she can "relate to," then presumably the
housing could have a number of negative effects. Living in
moderate- or middle-income housing might result in the loss of
the few social supports she relied on before becoming
homeless. On the other hand, being around two-parent families
and working people might provide positive role models for
children and make the single parent's job easier. Having
access to the information networks of working people might
make finding a job easier or provide a necessary "reality
check" for individuals who have had little past work
experience. Under these circumstance, living in economically
integrated housing might be seen to have a positive impact on
the relocated family's life.
As many as twenty-seven thousand families have been
rehoused in New York City since the mid-1980s. 1 But among
1 Office of the Mayor, New York City, Press Release on the
"Alternative Pathways Program," October 30, 1990.
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the housing options available to families living in shelters,
the IDFP is an anomaly. For one, the program openly "creams"
the shelter population, accepting only the most responsible or
"housing-ready" families. (Most other programs, including the
New York City Housing Authority and the city's in-rem housing
program, accept homeless families with a minimum of screening,
so long as the applicant has resided in a shelter for a fixed
period of time.) In addition, the program places participants
in Mitchell-Lama units--the best housing available to families
in the shelter system, according to homeless advocates--and
provides them with federal rental vouchers to ensure that
their apartments remain affordable. Finally, the IDFP
mandates follow-up social services for all participants; few
other rehousing programs include a service component.
Quietly, without press coverage or political speeches, the
state has crafted a thoughtful relocation program, and over
five hundred formerly homeless families have benefitted.
However, even in this better housing, these "more
capable" families are experiencing difficulties. Many have
encountered rent or public assistance problems since their
move to permanent housing. Some find it difficult to
establish social contacts in their new neighborhoods--friends
or neighbors on whom they might rely in an emergency. Few
participate in activities outside the home--work or training--
which might lead to long-term self-sufficiency.
While permanent housing has brought important stability
lop I- I , 911 m1w ,
to the lives of formerly homeless families, these unintended
outcomes are troubling. Presumably, the tens of thousands of
families participating in other rehousing programs in New York
City are experiencing even more difficulties.
In the following study, I will evaluate the results of
the IDFP, through interviews with participating families and
others connected with the program and through analysis of case
records and data that have been compiled by DHCR. Some of the
issues I will address include: What problems do families
experience when moving to permanent housing? What impacts,
positive or negative, can this housing be said to have on
formerly homeless families? and, What services have been
provided by not-for-profit agencies and by management? What
works? I will also compare this rehousing effort to others
which have been studied in New York City and elsewhere.
The study is divided into four chapters. In Chapter One,
I review the literature on family homelessness and on
rehousing programs. A debate rages in the human service field
about the needs of the family homeless. At issue is the
question of whether and to what extent homelessness is the
result of psychosocial problems experienced by families rather
than of the outcome of a tight housing market and an
increasing number of households living in poverty. In this
chapter, I review several studies which compare families
living in shelters with other low-income families.
Surprisingly, there is very little information available on
families once they move to permanent housing. I conclude the
chapter with a survey of this research.
In Chapter Two, I describe the IDFP: its history, the
actors and their roles, and the operation of the program.
Beginning with a cabinet-level decision to assist the
homeless, the state has crafted a complex multi-agency program
which includes participation of private-sector owners and
manager, not-for-profit service providers and public agencies
at both the state and local level. Who took the lead in
forming this partnership? How were the actors recruited and
the inevitable turf battles overcome?
Chapters Three and Four present empirical data about the
program. In Chapter Three, I describe the experiences of
three families who participate in the IDFP. I also make a
number of observations about the program based on interviews
with families, services providers, housing managers and agency
staff. In Chapter Four, I perform a quantitative analysis of
family case records and additional demographic data gathered
by the state. How do IDFP participants differ from other
families living in shelters in New York City? What are the
most common problems that surface in the families' first six
to eight months in housing? What interventions are made by
caseworkers?
Finally, I conclude with a series of recommendations on
ways to improve services to rehoused families and the
operation of the IDFP.
Chapter One--Literature Review
Literature about family homelessness has grown
exponentially since the problem first surfaced in the mid-
1980s. Studies are available about the characteristics of the
family homeless,1 the damaging effects on families and
children of living in hotels and shelters, 2 the service needs
of the family homeless 3 and even the implications of our
social policies intended to assist this growing population.4
Two areas of research are pertinent to the current study.
In one, researchers attempt to answer the question, "Who are
the family homeless?" through comparison studies with other
1 See E. Bassuk, L. Rubin, and A. Lauriat , "Characteristics
of Sheltered Homeless Families," American Journal of Public
Health, September 1986, vol. 76, no.9; Richard Towber,
Characteristics of Homeless Families: December 1985, Human
Resources Administration Office of Program Evaluation, February
1986; and James R. Knickman and Beth C. Weitzman, A Study of
Homeless Families in New York City: Risk Assessment Models and
Strategies for Prevention (Final Report: Volume 1), New York:
New York University Wagner Graduate School of Public Service
Health Research Program, September 1989.
2 Citizens' Committee for Children of New York, Inc., 7000
Homeless Children: The Crisis Continues, New York 1984;
Manhattan Borough President's Task Force on Housing for Homeless
Families, A Shelter Is Not A Home, New York, March 1987; and
Jonathan Kozol, Rachael and Her Children, New York: Crown
Publishers, 1988.
3 Ellen L. Bassuk, et. al. (eds.), Community Care for
Homeless Families: A Program Design Manual, Newton Center,
Massachusetts: The Better Homes Foundation, 1990.
4 Randell K. Filer, "What Really Causes Family
Homelessness?" The City Journal, Autumn 1990: 31; Martin Rein
and Donald Schon, "Homelessness in Massachusetts," An
Unpublished Essay, 1991; and Thomas Main, "The Homeless Families
of New York City," The Public Interest 85 (1986): 3-21.
very low-income families. If families living in shelters are
essentially the same in most characteristics as poor families
living in housing, then presumably homelessness is a purely
economic phenomenon: the result of a tight housing market,
dwindling economic opportunity in urban areas and inadequate
welfare benefits. However, if families in shelters are
different from their housed counterparts, then we might assume
that these characteristics play some role in their loss of
housing. The results of this research would be useful to
policy makers in designing preventative programs, in
structuring services for families in transitional shelters and
in planning permanent housing for formerly homeless families.
In the other body of literature, researchers evaluate the
outcome of programs which relocate homeless families to
permanent housing. While this research is limited and suffers
from methodological problems, there are striking similarities
across studies.
1.1 Characteristics of Homeless Families
In 1988, Dr. Ellen Bassuk and researcher Lynn Rosenberg
contributed to the debate on the characteristics of the family
homeless with a case-control study comparing families in
Boston shelters with housed families in low-income
.649A 11 ............... ,'I'll x- '-N.A6_,' .-- "1-1._ -_ , -- -
neighborhoods of the city. 5 Already well-known for her
research on the psychosocial problems of homeless adults and
their children,6 Bassuk strengthened her argument by
constructing, with Rosenberg, a control group of housed
families having similar characteristics (in terms of income,
age, number of children, ethnicity and marital status) to
subjects in her earlier research. After administering the
same survey and psychological tests to both, they concluded
that the homeless subjects differed in significant ways from
their housed counterparts. Among the differences:
* homeless adults more frequently exhibited a history of
child abuse (42 percent of homeless adults compared with
5 percent of housed adults);
* homeless women had fewer social supports (only 26 percent
of homeless women compared with 74 percent of housed
women were able to name at least three adults on whom
they could count in times of stress);
* homeless women had a history of abusive relationships
with men (41 percent of homeless women versus 20 percent
of housed women willing to respond described a
relationship in which they had been battered);
* homeless adults exhibited a greater incidence of mental
health problems (33 percent of homeless adults compared
to 12 percent those in housing had substance abuse or
psychiatric problems);
* children in homeless families suffered from more
psychiatric disorders. (Fifty-four percent of homeless
preschoolers versus 16 percent of housed preschoolers
exhibited at least one developmental delay, and 31
percent of homeless school-age children as compared with
9 percent of their housed counterpart exhibited the need
5 Ellen L. Bassuk and Lynn Rosenberg, "Why Does Family
Homelessness Occur: A Case Control Study," American Journal of
Public Health 78.7 (1899): 309.
6 Bassuk, Rubin and Lauriat, 1986.
................................. ...............
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for psychiatric referral and evaluation after testing.)
Bassuk and Rosenberg observe that while the two groups
experience the same environmental stresses--poverty, lack of
education, and family disruptions in childhood (such as
divorce or death)--the housed families are able to muster
resources and cope with stress by turning to friends and
family, while the homeless group, with fragmented supports,
more often turns to formal service programs for help. Note
the researchers:
Although chronic mental illness was absent in a majority
of homeless mothers, this is not to say that they and
their families did not have significant emotional
difficulties. In several respects--such as difficulties
in relationships with family, family violence, the
severity of the problems of the children, and the use of
services and agencies--they are similar to "multi-
problem" families first described several decades ago.7
The researchers conclude that the mere provision of housing
and income supports is not enough to lift many families out of
homelessness. They call for an integrated social service
program which addresses these psychological as well as
physical needs.
Recently, researchers at New York University conducted a
similar case-control study for the city's Human Resources
Administration. The report confirms some of the findings of
Bassuk and Rosenberg, while it contradicts others. In this
study, Knickman and Weitzman compare families applying to the
city for shelter with housed families who receive public
7 Bassuk and Rosenberg, p.787.
13
..........
assistance. The purpose of this research is to build a
predictive model of family homelessness by selecting factors
which are related to a parent's decision to turn to the city
for shelter.8
Knickman and Weitzman report that the shelter population
is extremely heterogeneous: while a small number suffer the
sort of psychological disorders that Bassuk and Rosenberg
describe, the majority become homeless for situational
reasons, such as living doubled-up, being pregnant or recently
giving birth. Among the differences they note between
homeless families and their control:
* homeless adults tended to be younger (73 percent were
younger than 30 years old, compared to 39 percent of all
public assistance recipients);
* homeless women were more likely to be pregnant or to have
recently given birth to a child (35 percent of homeless
women were pregnant and 26 percent had given birth in the
previous year, compared to 6 percent anj 11 percent
respectively of the housed population);
* homeless families were more likely to be black (54
percent of homeless families compared to 32 percent of
housed families);
8 Knickman and Weitzman.
9 The predominance of pregnant women among the homeless may
partially be explained by the preferential treatment of this
group by the city. Notes one social researcher, "Pregnant women
face a different cost-benefit calculation than other women.
Pregnant women (and new mothers) receive priority over other
homeless women for permanent placement in subsidized housing.
They are also guaranteed temporary placement in a private room
or hotel. Given these lower costs and higher benefits, more
pregnant women than non-pregnant women enter the shelter system.
(Filer, p. 38).
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* homeless families were less likely to have ever had their
own apartment (44 percent compared to 12 percent of their
housed counterpart);
* homeless families were more likely to have suffered
disruptive experiences as both children and adults (32
percent of homeless women experienced at least one
childhood event, such as child abuse, compared to 14
percent of housed families, and 45 percent of homeless
women experienced at least one event as adults, compared
to 20 percent of housed families);
* homeless families were more likely to suffer from
psychological disorders, such as substance abuse or
mental illness (8 percent of homeless families versus 2
percent of the control had participated in a detox
program in the past, and 5 percent of the homeless versus
1 percent of the housed had spent time in a mental
institution).
Briefly, the findings do indicate some incidence of
psychosocial disorders (mental illness and substance abuse)
among the homeless, but at a much lower level than Bassuk and
Rosenberg cite. The researchers conclude that while these
problems rarely surfaced in interviews, they were a strong
predictor of shelter use. 10 More disturbing is the evidence
of disruptive experiences as an adult or in childhood, such as
child abuse, living in foster care, or domestic violence.
Like Bassuk and Rosenberg, Knickman and Weitzman find a
predominance of these experiences among the homeless, and
conclude that such traumatic events are related to
homelessness.11
Other data in the study directly contradict the Bassuk
and Rosenberg findings. For example, Knickman and Weitzman
10 Knickman and Weitzman, 19 and 24.
11 Knickman and Weitzman, 18.
find slightly more social ties among the homeless, and
indicate that families are more likely to have seen those
family members or friends recently.12 Also, the researchers
suggest that the most significant predictors of homelessness
are situational rather than personal: pregnancy, doubling-up,
and frequent moves. In other words, families with few
resources find it much more difficult to regain stability once
they experience a disruption, such as pregnancy, or lose their
place of residence.
What explains these differences in research findings? I
think they are partially due to methodological differences in
the studies. Bassuk and Rosenberg sampled a relatively small
number of families (49 homeless families and 81 low-income
families) and conducted an extensive survey and psychological
tests with this group. In contrast, Knickman and Weitzman
surveyed over twelve hundred families (704 applicants for
shelter and 524 public assistance recipients) and relied on a
professional polling firm to conduct a more modest survey.
The evidence of more psychological problems in both the
homeless and control population by Bassuk and Rosenberg is
certainly the result their professional orientation and their
method of data gathering. Further, Bassuk and Rosenberg
constructed their sample of low-income families based on the
demographic and other characteristics of the homeless families
already interviewed, whereas Knickman and Weitzman chose
12 Knickman and Weitzman 25.
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random public assistance recipients as their sample. Which is
the more appropriate control population is open to
interpretation.
In summary, both studies suggest that homeless families
differ from other very low-income families in housing.
Families tend to be younger. They tend to move often and have
a history of shelter use. Also, homeless families in both
studies have more often experienced family violence, both as
children and adults. The studies differ in their estimate of
the number of families who suffer from serious mental health
problems, though both acknowledge the presence of such
families among the homeless. Finally, they differ on their
estimate of the availability of social supports among homeless
families, although the fact that a family has turned to a
public agency for assistance suggests that the family's
informal supports are limited.
These findings are relevant in discussing the IDFP. As I
mentioned earlier, the IDFP overtly screens among families in
the shelters for those without significant problems. If the
state currently rehouses only the top five percent of families
from shelters, can it "dip" further into the population of
sheltered families without selecting those who exhibit severe
problems or would have difficulty resettling?
Judging by the results of other relocation programs,
discussed below, I think the state could be serving a larger
population than it does currently.
1.2 Success at Relocating to Permanent Housing
Very little has been written about the experience of
families moving to permanent housing. The few studies
available are mainly impressionistic, based on small samples
and open-ended interviews. 13
However, the results are encouraging. Rather than
reviewing these studies individually, I will summarize here
six research themes from this body of literature:
Theme One: Most Families Are Still In Place
Two years after placement, approximately 85 percent of
families are still in place. This same figure is quoted in
three studies which attempt to measure the rate of turnover in
housing.14
13 See Settlement Housing Fund, Project Homeless: A Follow-
up Study for the New York City Housing Authority (New York)
March 1986; Maritza Guzman, Families in Transition: Adjustment
of Homeless Families to Permanent Housing (New York: Banana
Kelly Community Improvement Association) 25 August 1989; Larry
Long, "Survey of Relocated Homeless Client Families," An
Unpublished Report Prepared for the American Red Cross of
Greater New York, 1989; Susan Notkin, et. al., Families on the
Move: Breaking the Cycle of Homelessness (New York: Edna
McConnell Clark Foundation) 1990; Roger E. Herzog, "Rehousing
Homeless Families in Massachusetts," Unpublished Masters Thesis,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 1987; Arlen Sue Fox,
Progress Report: One and a Half Years of a Four Year Homeless
Families Rehousing Project (New York: Forest Hills Community
House) 8 February 1990; and Michael Klein, "The Move to
Permanent residence: Long Term Outcomes of Formerly Homeless
Families," Presented at the National Alliance to End
Homelessness, Arlington Virginia, November 1990.
14 Long; Herzog; Guzman.
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Theme Two,: Formerly Homeless Families Benefit By Living In
Permanent Housing
Notes one study, "The majority spoke of having 'arrived'
and of the feeling of pride and dignity that having a home has
given."15 In another study, 81 percent of families surveyed
(34 out of 43) answered in positive terms when asked "How has
having your own apartment affected your life?" The most
common responses to this open-ended question were: "[It]
improved my self-esteem" and "[It] has given or taught me a
sense of responsibility and pride." 16
Theme Three: When Problems Do Surface, They Tend To Appear
Early In Tenancy
In a 1986 study by the Settlement Housing Fund of
"Project Homeless," a rehousing program by the New York City
Housing Authority, researchers found that about one-third of
families experienced adjustment problems in housing. For the
most part, these problems, such as excessive noise, vandalism
or improperly disposing of garbage, occurred early in tenancy
and were soon resolved for all but a small number of
families.17
15 Settlement Housing Fund 4.
16 Long 19.
17 Settlement Housing Fund 3.
Theme Four: Managers Note A Small Number Of Families Who
Experience Significant Problems In Housing
Most families display no problems, according to managers.
However, they note a small number wlfo exhibit significant
problems after moving. These include incidents of domestic
violence, drug dealing, fights with neighbors and cases of
arson.18
Theme Five: Most Families Need Additional Follow-Up Support
Families often move to unfamiliar neighborhoods, far from
their existing supports. Several researchers recommend that
additional support services be available to families, at least
in the first months after resettlement.19
Theme Six: Quality And Affordability Of Housing Have An
Effect On Families' Long-Term Ability To Settle
Not surprisingly, several studies reveal a relationship
between quality and affordability of housing and neighborhood
and a family's ability to feel "settled" in their new
apartment. In one study, 32.6 percent of families (14 out of
43) stated that they did feel not settled in their apartment
on average two years after moving. The main reasons given for
this response were "crime and drug activity" in the
neighborhood and building and the "condition of the
18 Guzman 8; Settlement Housing Fund 33.
19 Guzman 14; Notkin 36; Settlement Housing Fund 35.
20
apartment." 20 In another study, 11 out of 12 families
surveyed answered negatively when asked, "Do you consider this
a permanent place for you to establish a home?" Many cited
overcrowding, because of births and significant others joining
the household, and neighborhood conditions as reasons their
present housing did not feel permanent. 21 Finally, a study
in Massachusetts noted much higher rates of recidivism among
those relocated to unsubsidized housing (27 percent of 231
cases) than to subsidized units (2 percent of 180 cases). 22
In general, most families moving to permanent housing
appear to flourish in that new setting. A small number
exhibit sometimes severe difficulties which suggest that they
are not ready, or may never be ready, for permanent housing.
Notes an evaluator of one resettlement program,
Clearly these problems [including substance abuse,
depression and domestic violence]...are beyond the scope
of a housing program to solve, although staff actively
attempted to assist clients in overcoming them. Families
with such problems are a source of considerable stress
and frustrgion to workers.. .and they exhaust time and
resources.
Finally, most families require time to settle, sometimes
experiencing difficulties in the first months after moving.
Researchers add that housing managers are ill-equipped to
assist formerly homeless families who experience problems and
20 Long 14.
21 Guzman 9.
22 Herzog 64.
23 Fox 18.
21
.............
that families would benefit from additional follow-up support.
This study differs from the above literature in two ways:
its use of client case records, which provides a chronology of
the families' first six to eight months in housing, and its
evaluation of the IDFP, which is unique among rehousing
programs. In Chapter Two, I detail the history and operation
of this program.
Chapter Two--Program Description
The Involuntarily Displaced Families Program (IDFP) is
co-co-sponsored by the New York State Division of Housing and
Community Renewal (DHCR) and the State Department of Social
Services (DSS). In the program, families from New York City
and Westchester County shelters receive priority for
apartments in state-subsidized multi-family rental housing.
Follow-up services are provided by referring shelters. In
addition, participants receive rental vouchers to ensure to
the long-term affordability of the units.
Since the first emergency order was signed in July 1988,
directing owners to set aside one out of every five vacancies
for a participant, over five hundred families have been
relocated to permanent housing.
In this chapter, I will describe the history of the IDFP
and the actors involved in this multi-agency effort. I will
then discuss the program's operation, paying particular
attention to tenant screening and the follow-up provided by
not-for-profit service providers.
2.1 The State Responds To Homelessness
When Mario Cuomo gave his inaugural address in 1983, the
governor called on all residents to be part of "the family of
New York--feeling one another's pain, sharing one another's
blessings, reasonably, equitably, honestly [and] fairly."1
Elected on a platform of "jobs and justice," the new governor
moved quickly to address one of the glaring social problems of
the mid-1980s: homelessness. Early in his first term, he
signed Executive Order Number 4, creating the Governor's Task
Force on the Homeless, and he appointed a close confidant,
William Eimicke, to chair the new task force.
Eimicke, an energetic public administrator and Albany-
insider, had worked at a number of important positions,
primarily on housing issues, with both the state and the city
of New York. Before joining the Cuomo administration in 1983
to become Deputy Secretary for Policy, Eimicke worked for the
Senate Finance Committee. He also served as deputy
commissioner of the New York City Department of Housing
Preservation and Development (HPD), directing the management
of over 40,000 units of abandoned in-rem housing.
The Task Force on the Homeless included homeless
advocates, such as Robert Hayes, Kim Hopper and Ellen Baxter,
co-founders of the Coalition for the Homeless, and the
commissioners of the DSS and DHCR. Eimicke recalls that when
the task force toured the state in 1983, most public attention
was focused on the problems of the single homeless. 2 That
perception soon changed, as the task force listened to
1 David Osborne, Laboratories of Democracy (Boston: Harvard
Business School Press, 1988) 211.
2 William Eimicke, former Commissioner of DHCR, Interview
by Phone, 12 March 1991.
24
. .. .
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3 Eimicke.
testimony about the plight of young women with children, the
fastest growing population among the homeless.
In late 1983, based on the task force's recommendations,
the governor proposed and the legislature passed a $50 million
capital budget program for constructing transitional housing
for the homeless. The new Homeless Housing Assistance Program
(HHAP) was intended to fund housing with services (day care,
case management, health care) as an alternative to the
barrack-style congregate shelters and the welfare hotels where
many of the homeless were then being warehoused. The program
was to be administered by the DHCR, which, while unfamiliar
with the human service side of the program, was an extremely
capable housing developer. However, when the program was
introduced in the legislature, many upstate Republicans balked
at approving a large appropriation for the housing agency.
The DHCR has its headquarters in New York City and is
responsible for administering rent regulation in the
metropolitan area and a number of federal and state housing
programs. Many of its projects and programs are concentrated
in downstate areas. In an eleventh hour compromise, the HHAP
was placed instead at the DSS, which is headquartered in
Albany where Republican legislators felt they would have more
control over the new program.3
Eimicke had been instrumental in designing the HHAP and
in pushing it through the legislature. In 1984, he invited
Nancy Travers, a close confidant and fellow "houser," to apply
for the Assistant Commissioner position at the DSS, directing
the new transitional housing program.
The placement of Travers at the DSS created a direct bond
between the housing and human service agency. Many of the
transitional housing projects developed by municipalities and
not-for-profit agencies required funding from both the HHAP
and from programs at the DHCR, such as the Low-Income Housing
Trust Fund. In addition, the state legislature mandated in
their 1984 and 1985 budget that the two agencies develop joint
needs assessments to address homelessness and together report
on all activities undertaken to assist the homeless.4 These
institutional links between the two agencies set the stage for
the creation of the IDFP in 1987.
As the state developed transitional housing for homeless
singles and families, it also became increasingly involved in
regulating the existing temporary housing system. The number
of families in the emergency housing in New York City (where
most of the homeless population is located in the state)
nearly quadrupled from 1300 families in 1982 to 4600 families
in 1986.5 The state, which pays 25 percent of hotel and
shelter rents and administers the 50 percent share paid by the
federal government, was under increasing pressure to control
4 Nancy Travers, Former Deputy Commissioner, New York State
Department of Social Services, Interview by Phone, 2 may 1991.
5 Manhattan Borough President's Task Force on Housing the
Homeless, 27.
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costs and improve the quality of emergency housing across the
state. Exposes on the deplorable condition of most temporary
shelter--some costing taxpayers as much as $100 per night per
family--led to the creation in 1985 of the Part 900
regulations by the DSS. Part 900 of the state Social Service
law sets standards for two types of temporary shelter: Tier I
and Tier II. Tier I is short-term congregate shelter while
Tier II is service-enriched transitional housing intended for
longer stays. It was reasoned that families or single adults
turning to public agencies for shelter would be placed first
in a Tier I shelter, after which time they would be referred
to the Tier II system. The use of welfare hotels, the main
source of emergency shelter for homeless families in 1985, was
to be phased-out as the number of Tier I and Tier II beds
increased.
2.2 Designing the IDFP
a) Background
In 1985, Cuomo appointed Eimicke as commissioner of the
DHCR. Already the chair of the Governor's Task Force on the
Homeless, Eimicke's position as chief of all state housing
agencies earned him the title of "housing czar" by the
media.6
Eimicke recalls a meeting in 1987 in which he, Nancy
Travers, Bruce Blumenthal, then a Special Assistant to Eimicke
and Myron Holtz, the Deputy Commissioner of Housing Operations
discussed ways in which the state housing portfolio could be
better used to serve the needs of the homeless. They struck
upon the idea of using the state's stock of Mitchell-Lama
rental units to rehouse a small number of capable families.7
"Mitchell-Lama" refers to private for-profit and not-for-
profit developments created under the Limited-Profit Housing
Companies law of 1955. The housing program, named after its
sponsors, is one of the nation's pioneering programs for the
development of middle-income housing.8 Under the program,
developers were given significant tax abatements and low-
interest mortgages for agreeing to charge low rents that would
limit their profits. Approximately 165,000 apartments,
including both co-op and rental units, were developed under
the program; 135,000 of these units are in New York City.9
The idea of placing homeless families in some of these
units had "enormous symbolic value," according to Eimicke.
"Most of the families living in this housing just moved in and
never left." 10 Mitchell-Lama is perceived as an unfair
7 Eimicke.
8 David J. Sweet and John D. Hack, "Mitchell-Lama Buy-outs:
Policy Issues and Alternatives," Fordham Urban Law Journal 17
(1989) 117.
9 Sweet and Hack 119.
10 Eimicke.
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income transfer to the middle-class, especially in the context
of today's limited public resources.
Sharing the benefits of Mitchell-Lama housing became even
more important to the DHCR as the issue of expiring use
surfaced in the mid-1980s. The 1955 Mitchell-Lama law was
amended in the mid-60s: A buy-out option was introduced,
allowing owners of developments to prepay their forty-year
mortgages at the twenty-year mark. The amendment was intended
to "sweeten" the financial package for developers by
increasing their disposition options. However, by 1988, as
many as 80,000 units had passed the twenty-year mark and were
eligible to leave the program. 11 As the state scrambled to
induce developers to stay in the program, through tax
abatements and new low-interest mortgages, they also became
increasingly concerned that the housing itself provide more
public benefits.
In July 1987, Eimicke signed the emergency order
directing owners of state-supervised family rental housing in
New York City and Westchester County to set aside one out of
every five vacant units in their developments for homeless
families.
Sam Roberts, "For Renters, Escape Clause Could Be
Costly," New York Times 21 May 1987, Bl.
b) The Actors
The program relies on the participation of six primary
agencies and organizations. Among them:
* The State DSS Office of Shelter and Supported Housing
(OSSH)
The OSSH administers the Part 900 regulations,
supervising and monitoring the operation of emergency
shelters. The office also awards grants through the
HHAP, creating new transitional housing. The OSSH is a
co-sponsor of the IDFP. Through their contact with not-
for-profit shelter providers, they accept referrals fir
the program, and they monitor the follow-up services
provided by the shelters.
* The State DSS Division of Income Maintenance (DIM)
Most IDFP participants receive public assistance. As
families move into permanent housing, staff of the DIM
ensure that entitlements--such as rent and furniture
allowance--are issued and that the local income
maintenance authority is notified of the changes. They
also act as a liaison between families and their income
maintenance centers when problems arise.
* The State DHCR Office of Subsidy Services (OSS)
Most families require additional subsidies to afford the
rents in the Mitchell-Lama developments. The OSS issues
federal rental vouchers to families, and visits the
families yearly for recertification and apartment
inspections.
* The State DHCR Bureau of Housing Management (BHM)
The BHM supervises the operation of 270 low- and middle-
income housing developments financed by the state and by
public authorities. In the IDFP, the office monitors
Mitchell-Lama developments to see that they are complying
with the emergency order. They accept referrals of
vacancies from management companies and pass them on to
the OSSH to be matched with a family. In addition, the
BHM acts as a liaison between housing managers and
service providers once families are in place.
* The Not-For-Profit Service Providers
The service providers operate Tier II shelters for
homeless families. Twenty-three shelters selected by the
. 1 i ..................... .............
state are currently participating in the IDFP. 1 2 The
shelters differ in size, with some sheltering only a
dozen families while others shelter as many as 300
families. Caseworkers refer families to the IDFP based
on screening criteria developed by DSS and DHCR. The
providers are also responsible for providing follow-up
visits to families once in housing.
* The Mitchell-Lama Housing Companies
Forty-six housing devel?ments in the city are affected
by the emergency order. The owners and managers of
these developments are responsible for reporting
vacancies to the BHM, so that families may be referred.
Once families are rehoused, the housing companies are
expected to provide the same services to these tenants as
they provide to the rest of their tenancy. The managers
are also oblivfted to keep the identity of participants
confidential.
A number of other agencies are involved indirectly in the
program. They include: the New York City Housing Authority,
which provided rental vouchers in 1989 for several months when
DHCR used up its allocation, and the New York City Human
Resources Administration, which also regulates Tier II
shelters in the city, administers income support programs and
operates a number of programs for families relocating to
permanent housing.
c) Screening and Follow-Up
Perhaps the most important aspect of the program design
is the screening and follow-up of families provided by not-
for-profit agencies. The IDFP, as I mentioned above, overtly
12 Lisa Glazer, "Housing the Homeless: High Quality
Apartments for the Deserving Few," City Limits February 1990,
20.
13 Glazer 20.
14 NYS/DHCR, "Management Bureau Memorandum #88-B-17, 14
October 1998.
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"creams" the shelter population, selecting only the most
responsible or "housing-ready" families for the program.
Appendix One lists the screening criteria developed by the
state. Apart from these criteria, state official have
repeatedly told shelters to "send us only your best families."
While some service providers need to be reminded of the
criteria, for most, the burden of following-up on a problem
family and the threat that a "bad" referral will lead to
disqualification from the program, is enough to convince them
to comply.
The state also mandates follow-up visits for the first
six months of the families' occupancy (Appendix One). The
not-for-profit shelters do not receive any additional funding
from the DSS to perform these visits, although some of the
larger service agencies receive funding from another source to
provide rehousing assistance. Small shelters, with only a
handful of staff, find it difficult to assume this additional
responsibility.
Screening and follow-up services will be- discussed in
greater detail in Chapters Three and Four.
d) Successful Program Elements
Since the first emergency order was signed in July 1988,
over 500 families have relocated to Mitchell-Lama
developments. The program has operated quietly, with almost
no media coverage and very little controversy.
Given the number of parties involved and the potential
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volatility of this issue--homeless families moving into
middle-income housing developments--this outcome of the first
three years of the IDFP is extraordinary.
Program administrators attribute the smooth operation of
the IDFP to four elements of the program design:
Element One: Making The Program Reasonable
Eimicke explains that the DHCR must balance the rights of
current residents of Mitchell-Lama housing with those of
others in need.15 One way of doing this is by staggering the
entry of families into buildings (taking every fifth vacancy)
and by dispersing participants across developments. Owners
are only required to accept IDFP families until participants
make up five percent of each building of each development.
Another way of "building reasonableness" into the program
is by assuring housing companies that some screening occurs
while families reside in shelters and that the families will
receive follow-up assistance. Given that most managers are
unfamiliar with the homeless population, these additional
assurances put to rest some of the fears of management.
Element Two: Building Support Quietly Before Going Public
The IDFP began as discussions between a small group of
close associates (Eimicke, Travers, Blumenthal and Holtz).
Overtime, this group threw a wider net, to attract support
from housing companies, members of the state legislature and
from service providers. Blumenthal, formerly an aid to a
15 Eimicke.
state senator, began building support for the program among
his old associates in Albany. Travers contacted her friends
in the social service community.
In late 1987, ten months before the emergency order was
signed, the DHCR persuaded three housing companies to set
aside a small number of units for a pilot test of the program.
Twenty-six families were placed with few problems.
Based on the success of this test, the agency recruited
the chairmen of one of the housing companies which
participated to actively market the program. Jerome Belson,
Chairmen and CEO of a real estate firm which manages over
18,000 units of housing, organized an informational conference
for Mitchell-Lama housing companies. The day-long program was
designed to allay the fear of owners and managers by
describing the IDFP and introducing the officials from the DSS
and DHCR who would operate the program.
The first and only press release about the program was
not released until February 1989, after the first 150 families
had already successfully relocated.
Element Three: Doing It Yourself
The IDFP is extremely unusual for a state program in that
state agencies administer services directly, rather than
through a local provider, such as the city's Human Resources
Administration. Nancy Travers, then a Deputy Commissioner at
the DSS, explains that the DHCR would not agree to set aside
units for families unless the DSS was a player. Essentially,
-----------
the DHCR did not trust the city to administer the program
responsibly. Given the city's rehousing record, resting on
quantity rather than quality, the agency did not believe that
the city would responsibly screen families or follow-up on
them once in place. 1 6
Through the DSS's role as both regulator of the not-for-
profit shelters and as co-administrator of the IDFP, they have
important leverage over the activities of service providers.
Similarly, DHCR's role as both regulator of state-subsidized
housing and co-administrator of the IDFP ensured that most
housing companies would comply. Notes Eimicke, "we can make
life very tough for a housing company which is not
complying... for instance, [by] accidentally not sending their
subsidy check.",17
Both the DHCR and DSS have appointed two or three staff
who are responsible for all aspects of the program, including
processing applications, matching families with apartments,
relaying move-in dates and contacting service providers after
receiving complains from housing managers or vis versa.
Several of the staff I interviewed displayed an
incredible sense of ownership for the IDFP, having designed
parts of it themselves.
35
16 Travers.
17 Eimicke.
Element Four: Putting Out Fires
Finally, when crises arise, the agencies act quickly to
resolve them. After the first emergency order in 1988,
residents of several developments expressed concern about and
even opposition to the program. In one building in the Bronx,
the tenants organized a meeting to urge the owner of their
development to "buy-out" rather than accept homeless
families.18  In south Brooklyn, a federal legislator mailed a
letter to his constituents stating his opposition to the
program and urging tenants to write to DHCR to complain.
In these cases, staff of the DHCR responded quickly by
meeting with concerned residents and by mailing letters
describing the program to affected parties.
The agencies have acted with equal dispatch when problems
surface with individual participants: a family creating
disturbances, a manager asking inappropriate questions at a
housing interview or a tenant being harassed by neighbors.
This commitment to put out fires quickly, has earned the
agencies the trust of housing managers and of service
providers.
18 "Hazel Towers Wants Out," Bronx Time Reporter 15 March
1990, 1.
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Chapter Three--Case Studies
In the spring of 1991, I interviewed nineteen
participants of the IDFP: eight families, three housing
managers, five service providers and three agency officials.
Many of the observations I make throughout this chapter and
the next are based on these interviews.
Chapter Three is divided into two sections. In the first
section, I present the stories of three formerly homeless
families, illustrating their backgrounds, their experiences
resettling and their perceptions of the IDFP. In the second
section, I make eight observations about the program based on
the three case studies and on my other interviews with program
participants.
3.1--Three Families
The eight families from which the following three case
studies are drawn were referred to me by the shelter providers
which had originally recommended them for housing. Six of the
clients were referred by one agency; the remaining two by
another.
This sampling may not be representative of the entire
IDFP population. Because the families were not selected
randomly from the pool of participants, the cases may be
slightly biased.1 Social service agencies may have chosen
only the "best" families for me to interview. And, my
insistence on contacting families in place for more than a
year and then only those whom I could contact by telephone may
have accentuated this bias, since agencies seldom maintain
extended contact with families and many clients find it
difficult to budget for phone service.
Given these constraints, I think the interviews provide a
rich addition to the quantitative data discussed in the next
chapter. For the most part, families were candid about their
perceptions of the program, of the buildings and neighborhoods
in which they live and of the agencies which referred them to
housing. All welcomed me into their homes, and many seemed
pleased to have the company--to show someone, even a stranger,
how well they were doing after having been homeless.
The three cases I describe below represent a spectrum of
the type of families which participate in the IDFP.
The Morris Family
It was raining the day Vivian and her family moved to
Ocean Park Apartments. Though it was over a year ago, Vivian
can recall the weather, the day of the week (it was a
Wednesday), and how she felt as the moving company transferred
her family's few belongings in plastic bags from the shelter
1 These families are not part of the sample of fifty
examined in the next chapter.
to the new apartment. "I didn't know where to start
unpacking. It was getting late and I had to feed the
children." The furniture truck that was to arrive at the same
time as the moving van did not appear until nighttime. And
the driver and his assistant wanted $80 to unbox and assemble
the three beds and kitchen table and chairs that Vivian had
purchased earlier in the week. "They just left it there in a
pile in the living room. I didn't have any way. to put it
together and I didn't know anyone in the neighborhood."
Vivian recalls that it took her about a month to feel
settled at Ocean Park. "That's when I started to think about
fixing things up."
Vivian balances her three-year-old son, Stevie, on her
lap as we talk. Stevie is very sleepy, but refuses to take a
nap with so much activity going on in the apartment. Twice,
Vivian places Stevie in his bed, and twice he wanders back out
to the living room and climbs back up on her lap. Vivian's
older son, Richard, is away at school. He attends fifth grade
at an elementary school down the street from Ocean Park.
Family History:
The Morris family became homeless three years ago when a
fire damaged part of the house in which they were living.
Vivian remembers hearing about the fire while in the hospital
giving birth to Stevie. On returning to the two-family house,
she found that most of the other tenants had moved but that
the two rooms which she had rented were not damaged. The
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family continued living in the house without services for
another year, when they were finally removed by police and the
building was condemned.
Vivian is in her mid-40's and is originally from the West
Indies. She came to the U.S. in 1972, and has held a variety
of jobs, including that of a shipping clerk at one of the
major department stores (a job she lost when she could not
make the commute from Brooklyn to New Jersey during the NYC
transit strike in the late seventies). She has never been
married.
With Richard's birth in 1980, Vivian stopped working
altogether and has been on AFDC since.
But being on welfare has not destroyed Vivian's pride or
her ability to care for her children or negotiate a sometimes
treacherous social support system. As an example, Vivian was
able to prevent her family from being referred to a "welfare
hotel"--"I had heard how bad some of them were"--by refusing,
even under threat, to leave the congregate shelter until she
was referred someplace decent. And, once -she and her children
were placed in a not-for-profit Tier II shelter, Vivian was
able to impress her social worker enough to be considered for
the IDFP.
Vivian believes that she was selected for the housing
program because of her "model" behavior at the shelter. "I
keep to myself and stay out of trouble." Her social worker
used to congratulate her for the way she carried herself.
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Vivian was told that she should consider herself lucky: only a
small number of families living at the shelter are selected
for the program.
The Neighborhood:
Ocean Park Apartments is located in Coney Island, a
peninsula in the southern part of Brooklyn. From the Morris'
twelfth floor apartment, one gets a spectacular view of the
New York Bay and of the lofty Verrazano Narrows bridge,
linking Brooklyn with Staten Island.
The twenty block by three block area is one of the
poorest in New York City. Coney Island is the site of a
massive urban renewal effort conducted in the 1950's and 60's.
The triple-deckers and brownstones which were once the
predominant housing stock on the Island have been replaced by
high-rise public housing projects and Mitchell-Lama
developments. Much of the land remains vacant. The
population has also changed. The first- and second-generation
Italian and Jewish immigrants who once populated Coney Island
have moved "across the subway tracks" to Brighton Beach and
north to Bensonhurst. The remaining residents are for the
most part poor and predominantly black and Hispanic.
Coney Island suffers many of the same ills as other areas
of concentrated poverty in the city: drug sales and drug-
related crime, poor city services and social and economic
isolation.
Vivian seems inured to these problems, which also plagued
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her old neighborhood in Central Brooklyn. She likes living at
Ocean Park Apartments because it is safe and quiet. The
building contains a diverse tenant population which includes
Russian and Polish immigrants, other people of color and
senior citizens. She thinks many of the tenants work, because
the building gets very quiet during the day and often a line
forms in the lobby waiting for the elevator in the evening.
Her only criticism of her neighbors is that they "seem
unfriendly." After fourteen months living at Ocean Park,
Vivian has only met two people in the building: the
maintenance man, who visits her occasionally, and a woman in
the building who provides family day care for Stevie.
Ocean Park Apartments is part of a large complex of
buildings in Coney Island, all managed by a single company.
There are 1,400 units in the complex, served by a 24-hour
security force and a maintenance staff. Many of the buildings
have laundry rooms and community rooms. The development also
boasts a shopping area, a Headstart and landscaped grounds,
including play areas. Ocean Park and other buildings in the
complex are relatively well-policed; many of the social
problems which affect other parts of Coney Island are kept in
check on the grounds.
Adiustment To New Area:
As Vivian was able to negotiate her way through the
homeless system, so she has been able to find the stores and
services she needs in her new area. Vivian was visited
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monthly by caseworkers from both the City's Office of Family
Services (OFS)2 and from the not-for-profit shelter where she
had stayed, but she considered these visits to be more social
calls than opportunities for assistance. "I'd be feeling a
little bit lonely, and then it was time for another visit.. .it
was sort of pleasant." Vivian registered Richard in school on
her own. She also found a supermarket in another neighborhood
less expensive than the market on-site and learned how to get
from Coney Island to other places in Brooklyn by bus (and save
the money of transferring to the subway).
For Vivian, living in Ocean Park has brought stability
and a new sense of hope. "I don't feel like returning to my
old neighborhood anymore. I have grown out of my old ways."
During our conversation, she brought out the certificate from
the 300-hour nursing aide program which she recently
completed. She has applied for a job at the local hospital
and at nursing homes, and hopes to get off welfare soon.
However, her future seems less sanguine when we discuss
the obstacles that still exist to her working full-time.
Stevie would require all-day child care, which Vivian
qualified for while she was in training but does no longer.
2 The Office of Family Services (OFS) were community-based
social service centers operated by the Human Resources
Administration. Among their duties, these offices were
responsible for visiting homeless families soon after they
relocated to permanent housing. The program had been criticized
for not performing visits on many families and for providing
poor quality service. Early this year, the OFS was eliminated,
a victim of the city's fiscal crisis.
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Richard, also, would need after-school supervision. Since
moving to Coney Island, Vivian has met few people. And, as
she has left her "old ways" behind her, so family and friends
who might have helped out in the past have fallen by the
wayside. For the most part, Vivian relies on her children for
companionship. "I don't feel lonely when my kids are around."
The Rodriguez Family
Unlike Ocean Park Apartments, which has retained some of
its middle-income and working tenants, the Crotona Apartments
in the Bronx has changed with its neighborhood--it is
populated almost exclusively by subsidized tenants. The low-
rise structures covering several square blocks were designed
in the early 1960's. Open courtyards and wide internal
hallways (a la Pruitt Igoe) which may have functioned well a
decade ago, are now difficult to police. The section of the
development where the Rodriguez family lives is now surrounded
by a high fence and barbed wire. A security guard buzzes
guests into the courtyard leading to the building entrance.
On entering the Rodriguez apartment, one is struck by its
contrast with the bleak neighborhood in which it is located.
Inside, one finds curtains with ruffled fringe, shelves loaded
with curios and a gurgling aquarium. It is clear that Nadia
Rodriguez takes great pride in the apartment which she has
decorated slowly over the last year and a half. "The
............... I'll,  ---
maintenance men when they visit tell me what a nice apartment
I keep...the nicest in the building."
Nadia speaks quietly; I must pull my chair close to the
table to hear. She is in her mid-twenties, but seems older
because of fatigue. Her husband, Juan, is not present for the
interview and one senses that he spends little time at the
apartment. Juan is from the Bronx originally, and has many
friends and family in the borough. Nadia, however, is not
familiar with the Bronx. She was born in Puerto Rico and
spent her teenage years in Chicago. The couple moved to New
York City after the birth of their son Jerel, who is now six.
Nadia also has a nine-year-old daughter, Margarita, with whom
she became pregnant at the age of fourteen.
Family History:
The story of how the Rodriguez family entered the shelter
system is a classic tale of how our social programs can create
the wrong incentives.
The family had lived in the Bronx for a short time in the
mid-1980's, staying with members of Juan's family. In 1987,
they moved to the Central Valley of California to try their
luck in the largely agricultural area. Juan is partially
disabled, missing several fingers on one hand, and has little
education. He has worked intermittently at best, and always
at low-paying manual labor positions: custodian, assistant
building superintendent, laborer.
The work opportunities in California, however, seemed
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little better than in New York. Nadia recalls that Juan
received a letter from a cousin in the Bronx. The cousin had
become homeless, but had received an apartment soon after
entering the shelter system. She encouraged Juan and Nadia to
return to New York, where they too might be able to get their
own apartment.
In early 1988, the Rodriguez family returned to New York
City, taking residence at the home of Juan's friend until
their Public Assistance case could be reopened. A month
later, the family approached the City for shelter.3 Juan and
Nadia were sent to a congregate shelter, but two days later
were referred to a not-for-profit shelter on account of
Jerel's poor health. Both Nadia and her son Jerel suffer from
a form of hemophilia, which requires constant medical
attention.
Like Vivian Morris, Nadia believes that her family was
referred to the IDFP because of their "model" behavior at the
shelter. "The social worker said that he was going to get us
the best housing. They were looking for people who would be
responsible in this program."
Seven months after requesting shelter from the City,
Nadia and Juan moved to Crotona Park Apartments.
3 In fact the percentage of homeless families who move to
New York City to take advantage of their relatively generous
public benefits is very small. The city's Human Resources
Administration estimates that only 5.4 percent of all homeless
families came from outside New York City immediately before
requesting emergency shelter (Manhattan Borough President's Task
Force 8).
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The neighborhood:
Nadia seldom ventures out of her apartment; after
eighteen months, her familiarity with the neighborhood is
limited to her children's schools several blocks to the north
and a shopping district a short walk to the south. While it
is only five minutes on foot to the renowned Bronx Zoo, Nadia
has never taken her children there. An Italian neighborhood,
featuring some of the best butcher shops'and Italian pastries
in the city, also borders Nadia's neighborhood; but she has
not heard of the area.
I spoke with four families at Crotona Park Apartments.
All related tales of shoot-outs, muggings and pervasive drug-
peddling on the blocks surrounding the development.
Few feel any safer in their apartments. Two months after
the Rodriguez family moved in to Crotona Park, a fire broke
out in an ap.artment two floors above. The Rodriguez apartment
was slightly damaged both by smoke and the water used to
extinguish the flames. Even now, Nadia loses sleep worrying
about another fire.
She also fears that someone will break in while she is
away. The walls at Crotona Park are very thin. Burglars have
been known to punch through the exterior walls adjacent to
doorways and simply unlock the front door by sticking their
arm around. The Rodriguez's have installed three locks on
their front door, but Nadia wonders whether this is enough to
thwart a determined burglar.
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On talking to Nadia, I have trouble telling whether her
level of fear is a realistic response to a dangerous
environment, or the anxiety of someone who has few external
contacts and is relatively unfamiliar with her neighborhood.
Surely, it is some combination of the two.
Adiustment to the new area:
Nadia is not disabled by her fear. While she has shown
little interest in getting to know the neighborhood, she is an
extremely resourceful and responsible parent. One example of
this is her ability to access quality medical care for her son
Jerel. Rather then going to the local hospital which is
reputed to be of poor quality, Nadia takes her son across the
borough to another hospital which specializes in the illness
from which she and her son suffer. Nadia also sees a
counselor at the hospital to lessen the strain of managing,
almost singlehandedly, her son's condition and the care of the
rest of the family.
Another example of Nadia's resourcefulness is the fine
condition of the apartment, and her ability to keep track of
the rent. Nadia's rent, like that of other IDFP participants,
comes from two sources: a state Section 8 subsidy, and the
City's public welfare program. Both pay the rent directly to
the management company. Several months after moving, however,
the Rodriguez family received a ten-day notice from Crotona
Park because of unpaid rent. The problem--one that has
plagued other IDFP participants--is that the Section 8 subsidy
had not yet kicked in. In addition, Public Assistance had
neglected to add rent to Nadia's budget. Now, to prevent
another letter from Crotona Park, Nadia religiously picks up
her rent receipts from the management office twice a month
(Nadia has calculated that if she visits the office three days
after she receives her welfare check, the management should by
that date have received the direct vendor check from Public
Assistance).
Like Vivian Morris, Nadia has met few people in her
building. Her only friend in the area is another mother she
met whose children attend Jerel's school. They occasionally
take turns picking up one another's children or watching them
after school. While other families from the shelter where the
Rodriguez family lived for seven months also reside at Crotona
Park, Nadia has expressed little interest in establishing a
relationship. "Why should I get to know them now," Nadia
reasons, "when I was not friendly with them while [I was] at
the shelter?"
Despite the many obstacles to settling, Nadia feels that
living at Crotona Park has brought important stability to her
life. "When you're in the shelter, you don't have
anything.. .you learn to appreciate what little you've got. I
carry that experience with me." Apart from caring for her
son, which she says is a "full-time job," Nadia has few plans
for the future. But she hopes to stay at Crotona Park
forever.
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The Handy Family
A mile to the east of the Rodriguez family is another
development built at the same time as Crotona Park and owned
by the same company.
Concourse Apartments consists of two twenty-story towers
on stilts which face the streets to the east and west and
cover an entire city block. The internal courtyard created by
the towers feels unsafe; it is seldom used except as a short-
cut between streets. The complex stands out in this
neighborhood: its height and slab concrete construction
contrast with the brick six-story apartments houses (a Bronx
standard) which predominate in the area. The building is
awash in the type of design flaws that Oscar Newman wrote
about in the early seventies: ambiguous demarcation of public
and semi-private space, multiple and poorly marked entrances,
and dark and uninviting elevator waiting areas.4
When Michelle Handy first saw the building, she wanted to
turn it down without interviewing. "I had requested an
apartment in Queens, where I am from. So when we pulled up
here and I saw the teenagers hanging out front, I said to [the
housing specialist], "turn this van around and take me
home!."" The worker from the not-for-profit shelter coaxed
Michelle into at least looking at the apartment. She recalls
4 Oscar Newman, Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through
Urban Design (New York: Collier Books, 1972).
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that when she saw the unit, a spacious duplex apartment, she
"fell in love with it."
Michelle Handy is a strong and energetic woman in her
mid-thirties; she is the mother of two. As we talked in her
kitchen, Michelle fielded telephone calls, shouted
instructions to a friend who was caring for four children in
the next room (Michelle operates a family day care business)
and cooked lunch. It became clear during our conversation
that this level of activity is the rule, rather than the
exception, in the Handy home.
Family History:
The Handy Family became homeless after the house in
Queens in which they were living was sold. Michelle and her
children were staying with Michelle's mother at the time.
Michelle was married in her late teens and had lived on
her own for several years. When her husband died eight years
ago, Michelle moved back in with her family. She was pregnant
with her second child, William, at the time. Michelle has an
older daughter, Tanya, who is now fourteen.
She is quick to point out that she has never been on
welfare. Michelle has worked intermittently at a variety of
jobs, including waitressing and house cleaning. However, her
primary source of income is social security widow's pension,
and food stamps. She completed only two years of high school.
After leaving the house in Queens, Michelle and her
children approached the City for shelter. They were first
....... ......................
referred to a congregate facility. Two months later, they
were transferred to a not-for-profit Tier II shelter where
Michelle's mother also was staying.
Michelle believes that she was referred to the IDFP
because she "kept such as nice clean apartment at the
shelter." But as we talked, another reason surfaced for the
referral--her persistence. Michelle hoped to return to
Queens, and attended an education and housing program for
homeless families in Forest Hills while living at the shelter.
At the program, she learned about a number of housing
programs, including the IDFP, which were available to homeless
families. Michelle recalls that she "bugged the housing
specialist" at the shelter to refer her to the IDFP. In
addition, she turned down housing from other sources, such as
the City's "van program", which transports families to see
renovated apartments in city-owned buildings.
Her persistence paid off: About a year after becoming
homeless, Michelle was referred to Concourse Apartments to
interview for an apartment.
The Neighborhood:
Concourse Apartments is located only a few blocks away
from the Grand Concourse, the main thoroughfare of the Bronx.
On exiting the D train on the Concourse, one is struck by the
towering art deco apartment houses, constructed in the 1920's,
which line the wide street. Since the 1980's, many of these
buildings have been restored to their pre-war opulence.
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But a only a few blocks away, the ambiance is quite
different. There one sees the effects of the abandonment and
arson which struck much of the South Bronx two decades ago--
gutted shells of apartment houses; vacant storefronts; lots
strewn with rubble and abandoned cars. Because of the number
of city-owned in-rem buildings in the neighborhood, the area
is a prime target in the City's ten-year, $5.2 billion housing
program. Indeed, the City has already rehoused more families
in rehabilitated apartments in this community district and the
district to the south, than any other neighborhood in the
city.5
Michelle could neither confirm nor deny the presence of
other formerly homeless families in new neighborhood; she
spends most of her time at home. Her apartment building,
however, appears to be a bit more economically integrated than
the surrounding area. Michelle estimates that at least half
of the families at Concourse Apartments work.
After eighteen months in her apartment, she has met few
people in the area, apart from those whose children she
watches as part of her family day care business. Michelle
continues to attend church in her old neighborhood in South
Jamaica, Queens, about two hours by subway. And she spends
time with her mother, who was able to return to Queens and now
lives in public housing in Long Island City. In addition,
5 Camilo Jose Vergara, "Rebuilding Drug City," Village
Voice 27 March 1990.
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Michelle has an aunt nearby in the Bronx, and family who live
"all over the city." Judging by the number of telephone calls
which interrupted our conversation, she maintains a lively
social life by phone.
Adiustment to new area:
Perhaps the most profound change in Michelle's life since
moving has been her ability to work. As we talk, Michelle
pulls an official-looking form from the bulletin board beside
the table. Three months ago, she completed classes and was
certified as a family day care operator. Michelle says she
began over a year ago watching neighbor's children for a
little extra spending money. Both William and Tanya,
Michelle's own children, were away at school during the day,
and she "was feeling kind of restless sitting around the
apartment alone." A friend encouraged her to sign up for a
day care provider training program in the neighborhood.
Today, cots and cribs line her living room. Michelle
takes in four children each day and receives a weekly check
from a local day care vendor.
She speaks warmly of the year her family spent at the
not-for-profit shelter. But she is not sentimental, nor does
she wish to maintain contact with the agency or with the
families she met there. The Handy family was visited for the
first six months after moving by a caseworker from the agency.
Like Vivian Morris, Michelle maintains that she enjoyed these
visits, but did not need any special help. "The visits are
mandated," she reminds me.
Before leaving, I am given a tour of Michelles's
apartment. A year and a half after moving, the place remains
sparsely furnished. This is perhaps more pronounced because
of its spaciousness (it has three bedrooms) and its
unnervingly white walls and high-gloss linoleum floors. But,
Michelle is clearly proud of the small improvements she has
made--the drapes with matching fringe, the framed prints, the
bathroom accessories--and the semblance of order she has been
able to build despite the many life tragedies she has
experienced.
3.2 Observations
Observation #1: Because of screening and other informal
criteria used in referring families, the IDFP participants
differ in significant ways from the general homeless
population.
It is clear from the three case studies that these
families are not typical of the general homeless population,
nor do they view themselves as typical. Common statements in
interviews included "I keep to myself" or "I did it on my
own." Several went to great lengths to separate themselves
from other homeless families. "They were looking for people
with ambition," one client noted describing the program.
Another mentioned that she was selected for the IDFP "because
I was not responsible for my becoming homeless."
One would certainly expect the participant population to
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be different, given the formal screening criteria discussed in
the last chapter. The formal criteria and additional memos
from the state transmit one unambiguous message: "Send us only
your best families." The fact that shelter agencies are
responsible for following up on problem families (something
they are not responsible for in other rehousing programs) and
that a "bad referral" might result in being disqualified from
the program, reinforces this emphasis on screening.
And, on the surface, IDFP participants differ in
significant ways from the general homeless population. Heads
of families are slightly older than the mean age of other
families living in shelters (31 years vs. 27 years). In
addition, a slightly larger percentage of two-parent families
participate in this program than is reflected in the general
shelter population (16 percent vs. 14 percent)--although this
may be the result of boyfriends or husbands joining the
household on moving, rather than couples living together in
the shelter which is rare. Finally, many of the families I
visited had members who were ill or disabled; Nadia and her
son Jerel, for example, suffer from hemophilia. Of the eight
families I interviewed, four had members who were
incapacitated in some way, including an adult recovering from
a stroke, a child with Downs Syndrome and another who is
wheelchair-bound with cerebral palsy. While not overtly
stated, caseworkers and shelters providers may view this
housing, because of its relative safety and extra amenities,
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as the most appropriate housing for these at-risk families.
I would argue that service providers go beyond the overt
criteria established by the state in selecting families. The
statement above by the woman who said that she was "not
responsible" for becoming homeless touches on this
distinction. As society somewhat arbitrarily distinguishes
between the "deserving poor" and the "undeserving poor"--the
infirmed and aged belonging to the first category and just
about everyone else to the second--so service providers
intuitively make distinctions among their client population.
Michelle Handy, who is widowed and has never been on welfare,
might be categorized as the "deserving homeless." Her desire
to work, and her connections to church and family, place her
squarely in the respectable working class, despite her lack of
income. Nadia Rodriguez, who exhibits immense pride in her
ability to maintain a home and minister to her and Jerel's
medical condition also seems blameless for her circumstances.
Caseworkers, informed by these distinctions, tend to refer the
most "deserving" families to this better housing.
One final and subtle way that IDFP participants may
differ from the general homeless population is in their
ability to understand and negotiate a complex system of
services for homeless families. Several women exhibited a
familiarity with shelter regulations usually associated with
advocates rather than with clients. Recall Vivian Morris, who
exercised her right to turn down shelter which she deemed
unsafe--in this case, a welfare hotel--in the face of threats
by city caseworkers. Another woman I interviewed had
organized a tenants association in her shelter (with the
assistance of caseworkers there) and went on to attend an
organizers conference while still living in temporary shelter.
Two families pulled strings in order to be referred directly
to a Tier II shelter from their last place of residence,
skipping over the requisite time in the more punitive
congregate shelter system. And all the families could
describe ways in which they were able to catch their
caseworkers' attention in order to be referred to the IDFP.
Some, like Michelle Handy, requested the housing outright.
Others participated in shelter activities or attended school
or training programs while at the shelter with the expectation
that they would be referred to better housing by doing so.
Again, these distinctions are somewhat arbitrary. While
IDFP participants may be more entrepreneurial then other
shelter residents, they nevertheless are (or were) homeless.
In a time of crisis, and lacking other supports, they were
forced to turn to the city for shelter. Many suffer from the
same social pathologies and poverty which characterize other
families in the shelter system. Of the eight families I
interviewed, only one had completed more than twelve years of
school. With the exception of Michelle, who receives social
security, all are long-term AFDC recipients. And most
families had experienced long bouts of dislocation--moving
from friend to friend, squatting in abandoned buildings--
before finally approaching the city for shelter.
While we make distinctions among those in the homeless
system, it is also important to recognize the qualities which
many families in the system share.
Observation #2: Most IDFP participants do not move into
middle-income neighborhoods or buildings.
The name "Mitchell-Lama" is almost synonymous with
"middle income," the two words are so often paired when
describing the housing program. It now appears that most of
the buildings to which IDFP participants move are not middle
income at all; many are extremely segregated--both by race and
class--and are located in some of the poorer neighborhoods in
New York City: Coney Island, East New York, Far Rockaway and
the South Bronx. This "other story" about the IDFP only
surfaced after I visited some of the developments and spoke
with the case workers who conduct home visits.
That IDFP may not be a story about income-mixing is not
an indictment of the program; indeed, homeless service
providers point out that the program provides the "best
housing" for families living in shelters. The fact that
housing and human service officials operating the program from
Albany see it as middle income housing, suggests that they are
somewhat insulated from the day-to-day details of the program.
Still, the developments are more economically-integrated
than other housing programs to which homeless families are
referred, including public housing and the city's in-rem and
Special Initiative Program apartments. The Mitchell-Lama
managers I interviewed described a variety of rent subsidy
programs to which tenants subscribe. In one development in
East New York, the manager estimates that 60 percent of the
tenants receive some form of rent subsidy--either through
Section 8, the 236 program, or through another program
referred to as the "Rent Supplement Program." A manager in
Coney Island estimates that 30 percent of the tenants in that
development receives a rent subsidy. Without more
information, it is difficult for me to tell how many Mitchell-
Lama tenants in a building are employed, are retired or are
recipients of public assistance. Most families I spoke with
are also uncertain about their neighbor's activities.
What is clear, however, is that IDFP participants are
referred to the buildings experiencing the most turn over. As
mentioned earlier, the state regulations mandate that owners
set aside one out of every five vacancies for an IDFP
referral, up to a cap of 5 percent of a building's population.
While there are 42 developments in the city affected by the
state emergency order, all but a handful have only rehoused a
small number of participants. Most families have been
referred to eight or ten developments with high turnover and
difficulty attracting unsubsidized tenants to their
neighborhoods or buildings. Two owners in this group have
stated their intention to accept more than the required five
percent per building, ostensibly to benefit from the extensive
tenant screening performed by shelter providers. 6
For most IDFP participants, moving to a Mitchell-Lama
development, even one with high turn over in a relatively low-
income neighborhood, is a significant step up. Of the
families I interviewed, none had ever lived in a building
which offered amenities such as a laundry room, maintenance
staff or on-site security. Few had ever had their own lease
or experienced a formal landlord/tenant relationship, with its
privileges and obligations. So, while the setting is not
middle-income per se, it still provides challenges in terms of
integrating or adapting to community norms. As one manager
noted, "Knowing to call maintenance when the sink is backed up
is not something you're born with. It's a learned response.
Some families let things go because they don't know any
better. They've never lived in housing where someone was
there to fix things for them."7
Observation #3: While most participants seem to be doing well
in their apartments, the process of settling takes much longer
than families anticipate.
Settling can mean many different things. It can mean the
process of unpacking and fixing up an apartment that Vivian
6 Glazer 20.
7 Eileen Feigan, Manager for Grenadier Management Company,
Interview In Person, 12 March 1991.
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Morris describes. Or, it can be just a feeling, as several
families interpreted the word. One woman, when asked how long
it took her to feel settled responded, "I felt settled right
away.. .As soon as I walked in the door I knew I was home."
Another woman, who has experienced problems in her
neighborhood, interpreted the word differently. After two
years in her apartment, she responded, "I still don't feel
settled here. I moved here because I was desperate to get
out, and because [the shelter] made me move here. But I felt
safer when I was homeless."
The two definitions of the term are interrelated.
Obviously, someone who has not acquired furniture or is living
out of boxes cannot feel completely settled. Conversely,
someone who hates where she lives will not take additional
steps--such as making friends or getting to know a
neighborhood--which might oblige her to remain in this place
where she is not happy.
For purposes here, I see "settling" as some amalgam of
the two: both a series incremental steps--turning on the
phone, registering the children in school, decorating the
apartment--that a family accomplishes and a "psychological
conversion" that occurs as one gains a sense of control and a
feeling of stability in their new setting.
Given this definition, I was surprised by how long it
takes families to "settle" in their new neighborhoods. Some
require extraordinary amounts of time to accomplish small
tasks, such as turning on their phone. Others move very
quickly to accomplish basic tasks, but then languish for six
months to a year before moving on to more challenging
objectives, such as returning to school or entering a training
program . Michelle Handy, one of the individuals who said she
"felt settled immediately," was in place for over a year
before she considered returning to work. And Michelle is the
exception: only three of the eight families I interviewed, all
in place between fourteen months and two years, have
participated in any activities outside the home since moving
(This issue will be discussed in greater depth in the next
chapter, when looking at the case record chronologies).
This is not a result of laziness or lack of motivation--
as I mentioned earlier, these families were selected for the
IDFP because they are the most motivated. Rather, families
themselves express extreme frustration at how long it takes to
accomplish new tasks. Many point to the unavailability of day
care as an obstacle which prevents them from participating in
self-sufficiency programs. While families receive special
priority for day care while in the shelter system--many Tier
II shelters operate their own programs--they lose this status
on moving, and often must wait on long lists to be served.
Many also experience problems with rent and with their public
assistance budgets once in housing. These problems, while
often not the fault of the family, make participants
apprehensive about taking on additional tasks. The problems
also take time--interrupting other activities in which the
person is involved. One woman who received a dispossess (an
eviction notice from the city's housing court) described the
many visits to the housing court, to her welfare office and to
the management office required before the rent arrears problem
was cleared up.
The families I interviewed described their high
expectations on moving into permanent housing. They had been
told that they were special and that the housing to which they
were moving is the best available to the homeless. Many
expected their lives to change in radical ways upon moving.
They then were disappointed when change took time or when the
problems which had haunted them at the shelter persisted after
moving.
Observation #4: The follow-up services, as they are currently
structured, have a negligible impact on rehoused families.
Few clients recall needing or receiving any tangible
assistance from caseworkers.
The shelter providers, as mentioned in Chapter Two, are
mandated to provide follow-up visits for the family's first
six months of occupancy: two visits in the first month,
followed by five monthly visits (Recently, the mandated number
of visits was reduced from seven to four, still in a six-month
period).
The families I interviewed all received the requisite
number of casework visits--which is not surprising, since I
was referred to the families by the not-for-profit providers.
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(As will be discussed in the next chapter, not all the
agencies are performing the mandated visits). What is
surprising, however, is the number of families who stated that
they did not need the assistance, or that the caseworker did
not provide any meaningful help during these visits. All
eight families gave some variation of this response.
How do we explain this? Is it just conceit on the part
of the families: the need to impress a stranger, to convince
me (and themselves) that they did it on their own? Perhaps it
is simply the passage of time: after two years in their
apartment, they do not remember what help they received when
they first moved in.
I think both these explanations are partially true. But,
an additional reason for the inefficacy of the casework visits
is that there is little that a caseworker can accomplish in a
small number of visits spread over a six month period. The
lack of client contact or of continuity between visits
precludes a traditional "case management" approach to
services. And yet, the clients are not experiencing enough
problems to warrant a crisis management or reactive approach
to services either. What is left, is a more ambiguous
monitoring role that most caseworkers currently play for both
their shelter and for the state.
The families I interviewed viewed the visits as social
calls. Vivian Morris recalls these visits with nostalgia--an
opportunity to talk; a respite from the loneliness and boredom
of living in a new and unfamiliar neighborhood. Others put up
with the visits because they were mandated, but did not see
them as an opportunity to access services or discuss personal
problems. As one parent noted, "[the agency] set us up with
an apartment.. .the rest is up to us."
Caseworkers expressed similar sentiments, both about the
ambiguity of their role and the problem of mandated visits to
a population functioning at a higher level than other
relocated families and in better quality housing. Said one
caseworker, "We usually have nothing to talk about after the
second or third visit." Another expressed concern that the
visits reinforce the type of dependency that is often fostered
by living in a Tier II shelter. "You have to keep your
distance at the same time you are helping," he noted.
"They're the ones that will have to deal with situations once
I leave... they must feel confident that they can do it on
their own."
Of course, the caseworkers provide some assistance. Many
supply families with information about the communities to
which they are moving, write referrals to day care or to
counseling and help with problems with public assistance or
with rent. (A detailed breakdown of these services will be
reviewed in the following chapter.) Clients relate stirring
stories about being introduced to other families in their
building--former referrals from the same shelter--by the
caseworker. Sometimes these introductions led to friendships
and important sources of support for the relocated family.
Even if no assistance is needed or offered, most families like
the idea of being visited by a caseworker from the shelter.
One man I interviewed keeps a letter from the agency by the
phone, in case of an emergency. "I am glad that they're still
with me," he said.
Caseworkers are limited by large case loads--often
carrying between thirty and sixty active cases--and by the
reactive nature of their work. Women such as Vivian Morris
and Michelle Handy, who are basically doing well, receive
scant attention when other families on the same case load are
living in substandard or unsafe housing, being threatened by
eviction or have members who are dysfunctional or mentally
disturbed. Caseworkers are also unfamiliar with the
neighborhoods to which their clients are moving. If one of
the goals of. follow-up assistance is to help the clients
access community services or better integrate into the
neighborhood, then these goals are poorly served by a worker
who is responsible for families placed citywide or who is as
unfamiliar with (or scared of) a neighborhood as the client.
Finally, case workers are limited by lack of training--many
with no professional education in social work--and by the low
priority follow-up assistance occupies within the shelter
agency. With the exception of a few large agencies which have
received service contracts to provide rehousing assistance,
most shelters are not reimbursed for the services that they
provide to families who no longer reside at their facility.
As will follow in the next chapter, these systemic problems
with the way follow-up assistance is provided have resulted in
a partial breakdown in the service agreement between the state
and the not-for-profit agencies.
Observation #5: Families have little contact with housing
managers. Few actually interview with managers as part of the
screening process. Most families only interact with
management in times of crisis.
Given that families have never lived in this sort of
structured housing environment, I was surprised that
participants are not required to interact more with
management, if only to be informed of the rules and
regulations and told of on-site amenities.
Families seldom go through a formal interview at the
housing office. When I asked participants whether they
interviewed for their apartment, most could only recall the
briefing and certification process they encountered at the
state Subsidy Services Office. Their only contact with
management prior to moving in was to fill out papers in the
rental office and view the apartment to which they had been
referred.
And after moving in,- few receive additional attention or
assistance. No development I visited has a formal welcoming
process for incoming tenants. None offers information about
community services or about how to operate apartment
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appliances. The family's only regular contact with management
is their monthly trek to the office to pick up rent receipts
(to confirm that direct vendor payments are up to date) and
yearly inspections.
Managers I interviewed did not see anything unusual in
this. They had been instructed by the state housing agency
not to treat -IDFP applicants differently from those on the
regular waiting list. The formal screening process includes a
home visit and a credit check, neither which makes much sense
for someone who is homeless and has likely never been
employed. Most managers waive these checks and rely
exclusively on the screening conducted by the not-for-profit
providers.
But, housing companies are generally satisfied with this
external selection process. Typical comments from managers
included, "Why are you writing about these families.. .they're
some of my best," and "We haven't had any problems with these
tenants...you know, the same sorts of problems we might have
with all the families here...playing their stereos too loud or
their kids playing in the halls." One manager observed that
the housing companies are already so limited in the screening
they are allowed to perform--because of fair housing laws--
that the shelter providers, with their informal and merit-
based system, are often able to refer tenants more responsible
than the typical applicant off the waiting list.
Some managers expressed concern about relinquishing
control over screening. One complained that the DHCR made it
very difficult to turn down applicants, even when there was a
legitimate grounds for refusal: "[The housing agency] told me
that if I wanted to turn down the applicant, I would have to
submit my reasons to them in writing. That's just their
style.. .you can bet that they never respond to anything they
say in writing!" Another, who prefers to interview
applicants in person, continues to exercise limited control
over the screening process:
My gut feelings would not be enough to turn someone
down. Now that doesn't mean that I won't follow-up
on someone if it doesn't feel right. There was one
man who was referred through the program who I and
several of the other staff here thought appeared to
be on drugs. In that case, I called the agency that
referred him to express my concerns. It turns out
that he wasn't a substance abuser at all, but was on
medicatin. It made us feel better to have
checked.
Housing companies are also dissuaded by the state from
maintaining separate tracking for the IDFP participants. Most
managers know which tenants are participants--if only ,
informally. One said she is able to identify the IDFP tenants
because their rent subsidy comes from a separate source and
she sees the tenants' names regularly on these checks. I
assume that management maintains a list of families, if only
to know when a building reaches the five percent cap, but no
manager confirmed the presence of such a list.
8 Feigan.
9 Rosalyn Barrie, Manager of Castleton Park Apartments,
Interview By Phone, 16 April 1991.
This then raises an important question: How do the
managers know that the IDFP participants are doing well if
they do not maintain separate records of their performance?
Perhaps in the state agency's vigilance to protect the rights
and privacy of participants, they have lost the opportunity
monitor program outcomes. The three managers I was referred
to by the DHCR to interview were unsure whether they were
responsible for reporting to the state if a family moves out
or is evicted. None saw their responsibilities to
participants as extending beyond the initial offer of an
apartment.
Observation #6: Most families are not familiar with the
neighborhoods in which they are living.
When families are referred to the IDFP, they fill out a
form which allows them to choose the neighborhood in which
they would prefer to live. The agency then tries to match
vacancies with these requests. Unfortunately, families are
seldom matched with the neighborhood that -they request. Of
the eight families I interviewed, none moved to the
neighborhood they had requested, though most were relocated in
their borough of choice.
Part of the difficulty in matching families with
buildings is that the agency cannot predict where vacancies
will next appear. If a family has requested Brooklyn, but all
that is currently available are apartments in the Bronx or in
Far Rockaway, should the family wait? Should they ask to be
referred to another housing program? Or should they try their
luck and view the available apartments, even if they are in
neighborhoods which they are not familiar? Given the choice,
most families opt to view any available apartments. "When I
came to see this apartment," recalls one woman who moved to a
neighborhood with which she was not familiar, "I figured that
[the housing specialist] knew everything.. .besides, I was
dying to get out of the shelter." Some families mentioned
feeling pressured by the service provider to accept their
apartment. While participants are informed by the state that
they are allowed a choice of three apartments, none of the
eight families I interviewed saw more then one.
Surely, it would be impractical to attempt to refer every
applicant to the neighborhood where they once lived. Many
Mitchell-Lama developments are on urban renewal sites and
themselves make up entire neighborhoods (consider River Park
Towers, cut off from the Bronx by the Major Deegan Expressway
or developments on Roosevelt Island and in Arverne). Some
families do not want to return to their neighborhood of
origin. Vivian Morris viewed the IDFP as an opportunity to
"put [her] old ways behind her." Victims of domestic violence
must be able to shield themselves from their batterer. And,
of course, some families have experienced so much dislocation
that there is no neighborhood that they strongly identify
with.
However, for those families that do have some place they
can call home, rehousing them in their neighborhood of origin
would provide important social supports and help to stabilize
families after long periods of dislocation. In the attempt to
place families as quickly as possible, the importance of
matching families with neighborhoods has received low
priority.
Observation #7: Few families have established strong ties in
their new neighborhoods. This lack of social supports may
have long term consequences both in terms of a family's
ability to respond to crisis and to move towards self-
sufficiency.
One measure of how well a family has integrated into a
community is its "connectedness" to neighbors: the number of
tenants in a building that a family has met or can rely on in
a time of crisis; the ability of a family to participate in
social organizations in a building or neighborhood, such as
tenants associations, churches and community groups; the
familiarity of a family with the name of its neighborhood,
with its boundaries or its collective history as defined by
residents.
By this definition, few of the families I interviewed can
be said to have integrated into their new neighborhoods. Most
know only one or perhaps two of their neighbors after fourteen
months to two years of residency. Few participate in other
activities in their area. Although many cite the presence of
a tenants association in their buildings, only one participant
ever attended a meeting. Many have children who attend school
or pre-school in the surrounding neighborhood, but again no
one I interviewed considered participating in their child's
schooling. Like Nadia Rodriguez, who was oblivious of the
nearby Bronx Zoo, families know their neighborhood well enough
to locate their child's school and the local food store, but
no better. This isolation, both geographic and social, was
perhaps the most striking observation that surfaced during my
week of interviews with families.
But, what does it mean? Perhaps living a private life
among strangers is commonplace in contemporary society, or at
least in New York City. How many of us know or socialize with
our neighbors? How many of us belong to voluntary
organizations in our neighborhoods? I may be applying
unreasonably high standards in evaluating participants'
success at resettling.
The buildings and communities where families are moving
also may not be conducive to the type of group interaction
which I describe. Sociologist Lee Rainwater, writing in the
late sixties, observed that families living in unsafe
buildings and neighborhoods tend to compensate for these
dangers by "locking out" possible human and non-human threats.
The home then becomes a "haven" in an insecure world. "Thus,
at the cost perhaps of increased isolation," notes Rainwater,
... [residents] sometimes place a great deal of value
on privacy and on living a quiet life behind the
locked doors of their apartments. When the
apartment itself seems safe it allows the family to
begin to elaborate a home to maximize coziness,
comfortable enclosure, and lack of exposure. Where,
as in St. Louis [at the ill-fated Pruitt Igoe
project], the laundry rooms seem unsafe places,
tenants tend to prefer to do their laundry in their
homes, sacrificing the possibility of neighborly
interactions to gain1f greater sense of security of
person and property.
Many of the families I interviewed perceive their buildings
and neighborhoods as unsafe. I do not know whether these
fears are exaggerated because families are not familiar with
an area, or whether they are grounded in experience. However,
it is clear that participants have compensated for this
perceived danger by leading a more reclusive life.
For most of us, living in seclusion from our neighbors
would not present a problem. Many of us have jobs or attend
school and derive some sense of community from these
interactions. Family may live nearby or be available by
phone. And most people can name a half dozen friends with
whom they interact regularly or can rely on in a time of
crisis.
Few of the families I interviewed could match this
inventory of social supports. Six of the eight could name
only one or two people that they can call if they experience a
problem. Only three of the eight participate in an activity
outside the home--work, school, training, or volunteering--
which might bring them in contact with others. And, only one
10 Lee Rainwater, "Fear and the House-as-Haven in the Lower
Class," American Institute of Planners Journal (January 1966)
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person was engaged in a formal counseling program. Those,
like Michelle Handy, who benefit from the support of friends
and an extended family, are uncommon among IDFP participants.
And even in Michelle's case, the relationships were made prior
to the on-set of homelessness. Few families have developed
strong and lasting friendships since their move to permanent
housing.
For a single woman raising a family in an unfamiliar
neighborhood, this lack of social support can have serious
long-term consequences. In a growing body of literature,
social support is positively linked with longevity and the
ability to cope with stress and negatively related to burn-out
in high-stress jobs, depression and psychological
disorders.11
Of course it is easy to be facile about social support.
Not all relationships are supportive. Certainly, a woman
involved in an abusive relationship would be better off
without her significant other. Also, it is unclear whether
more social supports are always better, or alternatively,
whether the marginal benefit of each additional support
reaches zero eventually. Finally, supports do not have to be
utilized in order to be helpful. Perceived supports--as in
the case of the man who keeps the phone number of the service
11 See Manuel Barrera Jr., "Distinctions Between Social
Support Concepts, Measures, and Models," American Journal of
Community Psychology 14 (1984): 413; and S. Cohen and L. Syme,
eds. Social Support and Health (Orlando: Academic Press 1985)
Chap. 5.
agency by his telephone--can sometimes be as therapeutic as
enacted supports.
What is clear, however, is that it is not wise or healthy
for a single parent trying to raise a family to "go it alone."
"When you meet someone who tells you they 'keep to
themselves,"' says Dr. Ellen Bassuk, a researcher on family
homelessness, "you know there is eventually going to be
trouble. That tough-guy routine only works for a while."
Bassuk recommends a variety of strategies aimed at
reconnecting clients with friends and family after
resettlement and at establishing new supports. One model of
services she points to is the "Family Support Center," a
modern version of the age-old settlement house. 12
The Family Support Center is a neighborhood-based non-
residential center providing a variety of services for local
residents: day care, parenting classes, peer group support as
well as case management and referrals for special needs. The
Support Center concept differs from the model of services
currently available to homeless and rehoused families: it
fosters informal (or neighborly) supports while providing
formal support; it offers services to all neighborhood
residents, and so allows homeless families to receive support
in a less stigmatizing atmosphere; finally, it is community-
based and reflects the cultural and ethnic orientation of the
locality and serves as a foundation for empowering local
12 Ellen L. Bassuk, Interview by Phone 9 April 1991.
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residents.13 The Support Center model, and off shoots of it
like the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation Intensive Case
Management Program in New York City, is receiving
increasing attention from social researchers because of its
focus on prevention and its ecological or "holistic" approach
to service provision (i.e. viewing the child as part of a
family unit and the household as part of a community rather
that serving each in isolation).
However, in the absence of a structured support program,
families manage on their own to make some friends and identify
other informal supports. Two women I interviewed met friends
through their children's school. Another belongs to a local
church. In two cases, a client was introduced by her
caseworker to another family originally from the same shelter
who resided in her building. The "veteran" family then became
an important source of assistance for the newly rehoused
family.
A number of service providers have begun offering
"community peer support groups" for former residents, either
at the shelter or in a neighborhood location. Two of the
eight families I interviewed had attended sessions of these
groups. As I noted earlier, families recall their stay at the
Tier II shelter with warmth and nostalgia; for some,
13 Bassuk, et. al. (eds.) 83.
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sponsorship by the not-for-profit agency is enough of a hook
for them to attend.
In the conclusion, I will discuss ways in which these
informal mechanisms for establishing support might be
institutionalized.
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Chapter Four--Data Analysis
In the last chapter, I made a number of observations
about the IDFP based on interviews with program participants,
agency administrators, managers and service providers. In
Chapter Four, I will again draw upon these observations while
examining data collected about the program by the State
Division of Housing.
The IDFP differs from most rehousing programs in New York
City in that it has been extremely well-documented. Few
rehousing programs, as I mentioned, mandate follow-up services
by the shelter provider. A consequence of the IDFP's required
home visits is a store of case records maintained by the state
which chronicle the participant's first months in housing.
While as many as twenty-seven thousand families have been
rehoused by the city since the mid-eighties, through up to a
dozen different housing programs,1 no city agency tracks the
whereabouts or success at resettling of formerly homeless
families. The state, in contrast, maintains records on each
IDFP tenant. And, since most participants receive a Section 8
rental voucher, the families are monitored and visited for
years after the formal tracking process of six months. One
objective of this thesis is to portray the value of this data
for future social research.
1 Mayors Office, Press Release on Alternative Pathways
Program 30 October 1990.
In this chapter, I will answer a number of questions
about the rehousing program which were raised in the last
chapter: How do participants differ from other homeless
families sheltered by the city? Where have the IDFP families
moved? What has been the experience of families on moving to
permanent housing? What type of services have they received?
How many participants are still in place? My observations in
Chapter Three were somewhat speculative, based on interviews
with a small and unrepresentative sample of families. In this
chapter, I will complement this qualitative information about
the program with an analysis of data drawn from the state
records.
The chapter is divided into four sections. In the first
section, I describe the methodology used in analyzing the
Section 8 database and family case records, paying particular
attention to the strengths and weaknesses of the content
analysis method. In the next section, I provide a brief
profile of the study families: Who are they? Where have they
moved? How long have they lived in permanent housing? This
section will be followed by a more lengthy analysis of the
family case records, including a discussion of problems
experienced by families, typical interventions by caseworkers
and activities in which family members participate in the
months following relocation. In the final section, I address
the issue of recidivism in this rehousing program. The IDFP
has an extraordinarily low rate of turnover among
participating families: as many as 98 percent of the families
are still in their apartments an average of two years after
resettlement. How does this figure compare with other
rehousing programs? What factors explain the IDFP's success
at retaining program participants?
4.1 Methodology
Samplina
Approximately 520 families have been relocated to
permanent housing since the first placements were made as part
of a pilot program in late 1987. A random sample of 50 cases
was drawn from a master list of participants. Three small
subgroups were excluded from the sample: families in place
less than six months, referrals from domestic violence
shelters (who, while similar in characteristics to other IDFP
tenants, were not part of the study population) and placements
made outside New York City, primarily in Westchester County.
Together, these three excluded subgroups comprise 70 of the
520 placements. The sample of 50 families was drawn from the
remaining pool of roughly 450 cases. Each case in the sample
represents approximately nine participants in the program.
Data Sources
A database was then constructed, drawing on records from
three different sources:
1) Section 8 database: The DHCR Subsidy Services office
maintains a computer database of all participants in the
-'1- 11 . "I',"",',,"",',,", ........... I'll -, ' I.- I I, - .1 1 - 1 I'll I ............
rental voucher program. Pertinent information on file
includes family composition, race and ethnicity, the age
of family members, move-in date, placement location, rent
amount and the family's source of income. This database
is updated regularly, and presumably reflects changes in
income or in family composition which surface during
yearly tenant recertification.
The Subsidy Services office was able to match 37 of the
50 case names with data records. The missing cases
reflect either misspelling of case names or use of a
different surname which resulted in no match, the one
family out of the 50 who is no longer in place and whose
case had been removed from the database and a small
number of families who moved into their Mitchell-Lama
apartment with a New York City Housing Authority rather
than the DHCR rental voucher.
2) Family Case Records: After each mandated home visit,
the service provider fills out a "Monthly NFP Report" and
mails it to the State Department of Social Services,
which makes a copy and mails the original to the DHCR.
The reports detail the family's progress at settling,
discussing problems experienced by the family, activities
in which parents and children are participating and any
interventions made by the caseworker. The length and
content of reports varies considerably by caseworker.
(The methodological problems raised in interpreting the
case records are discussed below.)
Service providers are required to visit the families
seven times: twice in the first month, followed by five
consecutive monthly visits. The records, then, provide a
detailed chronology of the family's first half year in
housing.
Unfortunately, many of the sampled files were not
complete. Fifteen contained no records at all, and only
fifteen of the remaining thirty-five cases were
technically complete (where the case has deliberately
been closed after the requisite six months of visits). I
interpret missing records to mean that a family was not
visited. Of course, alternative explanations are also
plausible: that the visits were performed but the
paperwork was never completed or that the files were
lost. However, given the systemic problems with follow-
2 For a brief period in 1989, the state, which had run out
of rental vouchers, turned to NYCHA for assistance.
Approximately 50 of the 450 participants were placed using NYCHA
vouchers.
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up discussed earlier, I think that families were simply
not visited in most cases.
3) Management Case Logs: The Management Services office
at the DHCR also keeps records on the IDFP participants:
specifically, complaints by managers to the agency about
a particular client and records on move-outs and
evictions. For this study, the list of fifty families
was matched against agency logs for instances where a
client is no longer in place. As I mentioned above, the
instances of "recycling" are astoundingly low: only one
of the fifty families has moved, according to agency
records.
For each of the above sources, the names and other
identifying information about the families (such as apartment
and AFDC case number) were removed, and cases were assigned a
number which was used to link the databases when assembling
the master file. While the first and third sources of data
were easily quantified, the family case records required
coding in order to be useful for statistical analysis. I
performed a content analysis on the 168 case records (35
families times approximately 4.5 visits per family) to convert
them to a useable format.
Content Analysis
Content analysis is a method commonly used in social
research for the analysis of existing and often qualitative
data: historical documents, political speeches, even
children's television programming (which has been scrutinized
over the years for the presence of violence). The method has
a number of advantages over other forms of social inquiry.
For one, it is quick and inexpensive to perform. Since it
relies on the analysis of existing data, content analysis can
be carried out without designing and administering a survey or
spending months in the field getting to know the data
subjects. The method is also unobtrusive, and so might reveal
qualities about the subjects or the nature of their
interaction that would not surface in a direct interview.3
The IDFP case records provide a chronology of events
which surfaced in home visits during the early months after
resettlement. This information documents not only what events
occurred six months to three years ago, but also what order
the events occurred and the types of interventions the
caseworkers made at the time. Presumably, such a detailed
history would be difficult to recall in an interview. In
addition, both families and caseworkers might be tempted to
reconstruct events, to present themselves or their client or
caseworker in a better light. For example, the finding that
30 percent of families did not receive home visits would
probably not have surfaced in an interview with service
providers.
Content analysis also has a number of disadvantages over
other methods. One, of course, is that the analysis is only
as good as the quality of the existing data. Caseworkers
received little guidance in how to fill out the case records.
Some workers with a more clinical bent wrote detailed
statements about their client's state of mind, the dynamics of
3 Earl R. Babbie, The Practice of Social Research. 2nd Ed.
(Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1979) Chap.
9.
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family interaction and their client's adherence to a service
plan. Others merely noted that a visit occurred, while
mentioning problems as they surfaced. This uneven quality of
the case records made it difficult to develop categories and
to code the records. Caseworkers also failed to record
certain events--such as the client's ability to access day
care--which I had hoped to discuss in the study. They
sometimes were not precise in their use of language--confusing
a dispossess, which is an eviction notice from the city's
Housing Court, with a 10-day late rent notice from management,
or referring to someone as "depressed," without describing
what they mean: a little down or clinically depressed.
Coding of the Case Records
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of content analysis
is the issue of coding. Converting qualitative material, say
a Saturday morning cartoon, into a case file documenting the
instances and the intensity of violence requires a system of
coding that meets rigorous standards of reliability and of
validity. Reliability refers to whether a particular
technique, repeatedly applied to the same object, would yield
the same results each time. For example, do researchers code
an event, such as a coyote getting run over by a steamroller,
the same way each time? Validity, in contrast, refers to the
extent to which an empirical measure adequately reflects the
real meaning of the concept under consideration. Does a scene
in which a coyote gets run over by a steamroller connote an
86
...
act of violence? In other words, an event may be coded
properly each time it occurs (high in reliability), but it may
not measure what the researchers had intended (low in
validity).
Luckily, the issues raised in coding the IDFP case
records are less complex. Appendix Two contains the coding
system used in analyzing the 168 case records. In developing
the code, I first read through the case records and mapped out
a general framework of what occurred during visits. Briefly,
each case record documents an inventory of problems
experienced by a family, a series of interventions by a
caseworker and a list of activities in which the head of
household is participating. While many records strayed from
this format, the pattern was common enough to use it as a
guide in coding. I then disaggregated problems, interventions
and family activities into numerous categories and
subcategories, reasoning that I could always recombine
categories at a later stage. Finally, I pretested the coding
scheme on a small sample of the records.
The actual coding of the case records was relatively
straightforward. Only a few of the categories required any
subjective judgement--such as distinguishing between a "major"
and a "minor" repair problem or a "major" and a "minor"
illness, or deciding whether to code a case "depressed/lonely"
based on the description of the client by the caseworker. The
coding system benefits from high reliability as most events,
such as a rent or public assistance problem, require no
interpretation. There is little doubt whether these events
occurred. Whether the occurrence of these problems provides
an operational definition of the level of stress experienced
by families--that is, the more problems, the higher the
stress--is a topic that will be discussed later in the
chapter.
4.2 Profile of the Study Families
Demographics
The IDFP participants tend to be older and their families
slightly smaller than comparison families in the city shelter
system; in other measurable ways the populations are similar
(Table 4.1). The average IDFP household is made up of a 31-
year-old single woman with two children under the age of ten.
Approximately 84 percent of IDFP households are headed by a
single adult, compared to 86 percent of households in the
shelter population. The average number of children is 2.04,
compared to 2.3 in the shelter population, while the average
age of children is 6.9 years and 6 years respectively.
Because the head of household is 4 years older in the IDFP
family (31 years compared to 27 years), the relative
difference in number and age of children is actually larger
than presented here. Finally, the racial and ethnic
background of participants and the comparison group are almost
...................... ..............
identical: 95 percent Black or Hispanic, 5 percent white.
The Section 8 database contains no historical information
about IDFP participants, such as the reason for homelessness,
the level of education or work experience or the length of
time in the shelter system. This information would be useful
in examining whether service providers "cream" and to what
extent, and in describing which factors are related to success
in housing.
As I suggested in the last chapter, other less measurable
factors, such as motivation or an ability to "work the
system", may also differentiate IDFP participants from the
general shelter population.
Table 4.1: Comparing the Characteristics of IDFP
Participants with the NYC Shelter Population
Description IDFPParticipants
NYC Shelter
Population *
Mean Age, Head of Hsld.
Range
% Female Head of Hsld.
Avg. # of Children
Avg. Age of Children
% Children Under 5
% Black or Hispanic
% White
31 yrs.
19-49 yrs
84%
2.04
6.9
36%
95%
5%
27 yrs.
86%
2.3
6
50%
95%
5%
* Source: NYC Human Resources Administration, "Characteristics and
Housing Histories of Families Seeking Shelter From HRA," October
1986.
Placement Locations
Families have been placed throughout the five boroughs;
however, they tend to be concentrated in two areas of the
city: Coney Island and the South Bronx (Figure 4.1). In all,
60.5 percent of families (n=23) have been relocated to these
two neighborhoods. If East New York and Arverne are added to
this list, then 78.9 percent of families (n=30) are accounted
for. The remaining 21.1 percent of families (n=8) are
dispersed in several locations in Manhattan, in the Northeast
and Northwest Bronx, in Central Brooklyn and on Staten Island.
The reason for this concentration, as I alluded to
earlier, is the higher turnover rate in some developments,
predominantly those in low-income minority neighborhoods.
While 46 housing developments are affected by the state
emergency order, only 22 are represented in the sample
distribution, and several of these share the same neighborhood
boundaries, such as Coney Island and the South Bronx. The
highest concentration of families in any one development is
eight, followed by three placed in one development and two
placed in six developments.
Only 10.5 percent of the families (n=4) have moved to
economically integrated neighborhoods (including St. George in
Staten Island, the Upper West Side of Manhattan and the
Northwest and Northeast Bronx). Presumably, few Mitchell-Lama
developments are located in such neighborhoods, since most are
90
Bronx
upper
W. Side Queens
Bedford
Stuyv snt
East N.Y.
0
Brooklyn
Island
Staten
Island
Where
Have
Families
Moved?
o 1 Case
o 2-5 Cases
*5 +Cases
Figure 4.1--IDFP Placements By Neighborhood
91
developed on urban renewal land or in the areas least
resistant to subsidized housing. Without more information
from the housing agency about the location of state-subsidized
developments, it is impossible to know how many developments
exist in relatively middle-income neighborhoods and whether
owners of these developments are complying with the emergency
order.
I also have no information about the tenant composition
of individual Mitchell-Lama developments. While the tenant
population in Mitchell-Lama rental housing is diverse, both in
terms of race and class, 4 the developments themselves tend to
be extremely segregated. Most of the IDFP participants, it
appears, are ending up in buildings occupied by poor and
predominately minority residents.
Still, it would be helpful to know how much income-mixing
is occurring in a development, and its effect on the IDFP
participant. As I mentioned in the last chapter, the
percentage of subsidized tenants by development varies
enormously. It is clear that at least some of the
participants' neighbors work at well-paying jobs, given the
average Fair Market Rent in these developments (approximately
$600 for a two-bedroom apartment).
4 Phillip Weitzman, Who Lives in Mitchell-Lama?: Analysis
of New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey Data on Mitchell-
Lama Households (New York: Community Training and Resource
Center, 1989).
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Timing of Placements
The mean time participants in the sample have been in
Mitchell-Lama housing is just under two years, with the most
recent placement being eight months ago and the earliest
placement over three and a half years ago (in October 1987).
However, most families (81 percent, n=39) were relocated
during an eleven month period between December 1988 and
November 1989 (Figure 4.2).
The rate and scale of placements is affected by four
interrelated factors: changes in state and city policy, the
availability of apartments, the availability of rental
vouchers and the number of referrals by Tier II shelters.
The first placements in 1987 were part of a small
demonstration program. It was not until July 1988 that the
State Commissioner of Housing signed the first emergency
order, and another six months before the infrastructure--
staff, rental vouchers, apartments--was in place to begin a
large scale relocation program. The gap in placements between
March and July 1989 may have been the result of a lack of
rental vouchers: sometime during this period, the state
entered into an agreement with the New York City Housing
Authority (NYCHA) to access city rental vouchers for IDFP
participants. Another possible explanation is that the first
emergency order was to expire in July, and staff waited for
its renewal before again placing families. Finally, the
number of placements dropped precipitously after October 1989,
the result, I believe, of a reduction in the number of
referrals by Tier II shelters.
In late 1989, the city increased its efforts to close the
welfare hotels by rehousing a record number of families both
from hotels and from Tier II shelters (which cleared room for
additional hotel families). One indication of this effort was
the increasingly lax eligibility requirements for most city
housing programs. Over a two year period, from early 1988 to
late 1989, the Koch administration announced reductions in the
length of stay requirement in the shelter system to qualify
for permanent housing, from eighteen months, to twelve months,
to six months and finally to three months in late 1989.
Shelter providers responded to this change in city policy by
referring fewer families to the state housing program. One
reason for their decision was that it took much longer to
rehouse families through the IDFP than through other housing
programs, some offering comparable apartments. The average
wait between the interview at the state Subsidy Services
office and the actual move-in date was three and a half
months, according to Section 8 records. Considering that the
family may already have waited for between one and two months
between the time they were selected for the program by their
shelter and the interview with Subsidy Services, five months
would have elapsed. Most city programs, including the Special
Initiatives Program (SIP) and the New York City Housing
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Figure 4.2--IDFP Move-In Dates
Source: Analysis by author of data on the Involuntarily Displaced
Families Program provided by the New York State Division of Housing
and Community Renewal.
Authority, were screening families and relocating them in a
week's time. Another reason that shelter providers reduced
their referrals to the IDFP was the follow-up requirement
imposed by the state. With so much other "good" housing
available from late 1989-on, it made little sense to
participate in a program whose terms were more onerous than
other programs.
The state agency was caught off-guard by this slowdown in
referrals. When I began interviewing staff to prepare for
this project in mid-1990, the most common problem cited, after
kiihal"W"ig - -- ;,,, - -
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the mixed quality of follow-up services, was that Tier II
shelters were not referring enough families.
However, it appears that the number of placements is
again on the rise. (Since one of my criteria for selecting
case families was that they be in place at least six months,
the data does not indicate recent referrals.) In the last six
months, the number of placements has increased from five
hundred to approximately six hundred families, according to
agency staff. The increase in referrals to the IDFP may again
be the result of changes in city policy. Concerned about the
rise of families entering the shelter system and the possible
perverse incentives created by its rehousing programs, the
Dinkins administration has increased the length of stay
requirement to nine months for city-owned in-rem apartments
and one year for project apartments, and has barred homeless
families from some housing programs altogether.5 These
changes may have increased the appeal of the IDFP which has no
length of stay requirement.
4.3 Initial Experiences in Housing: The Case Record Data
The following section is based on the analysis of 168
follow-up reports submitted by not-for-profit agencies to the
DHCR. I used the content analysis method described above in
5 Thomas Morgan, "Advocates for the Homeless Fault Housing
Plan," New York Times 19 September 1991, Al.
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quantifying the reports. This section is divided into three
parts: an analysis of problems experienced by families in the
early months of resettlement; a discussion of follow-up
services by not-for-profit agencies; and finally, a breakdown
of the type of activities that family members are
participating in during the case record period.
Problems Experienced by Families
The case records reveal an extraordinary number of
problems experienced by families after resettlement. Most of
these can be classified as "institutional" problems--such as
difficulties with arranging the direct vendor rent payments or
with adjusting welfare budgets after moving--rather then
personal or client-precipitated problems. Of the total number
of problems experienced by participants (n=125), the most
common were: rent (24 percent, n=30), public assistance (19.2
percent, n=24), furniture (11.2 percent, n=14), health (9.6
percent, n=12), general depression (5.6 percent, n=7) and
repairs (5.6 percent, n=7) (Figure 4.3).
a) Rent Problems
Most families (54.3 percent, n=19) experienced at least
one rent problem during the case record period. The most
common reason for rent arrears was difficulties with the
direct vendor checks from the client's Income Maintenance
Center. In all, 40 percent of the rent complaints (12 out of
30) fell into this category (Table 4.2).
Ironically, the direct vendor payment system is designed
to reduce the incidence of rent arrears for public assistance
recipients. Under the payment plan, a tenant's rent is mailed
directly from the city's Human Resources Administration (HRA)
to the landlord in bimonthly checks. While the system is
voluntary or reserved for "problem rent payers," the DHCR has
required all IDFP participants to agree to have their rent
paid by direct vendor, perhaps to assuage the concerns of
housing managers.
Figure 4.3--Incidence of Problems by Category
Source: Analysis by author of data from the Involuntarily Displaced
Families Program supplied by the New York State Division of Housing and
Community Renewal.
Table 4.2--Summary of Rent Problems
Description % of # of Avg. Avg.
Cases Cases Time For Time to
Problem Resolve
to
Surface
Direct Vendor/ Pub. 34.3% 12 ---- ----
Asst. Error
Mgmt. Error 17.1% 6 ---- ----
Sec. 8 Error 8.6% 3 ---- ----
Client Misspent 8.6% 3 ---- ----
Dispossess or 10-Day 17.1% 6 6.9 ----
Notice Months
Total With Rent 54.3% 19 4.4 1.9
Problems (excluding Months Months
overlap) *
Total + 100% 35 ---- ----
percent experiencing at least one problem
+ does not sum to 100 percent because of multiple problems
reported
Source: Analysis by author of data from the Involuntarily Displaced
Families Program supplied by the New York State Division of Housing
and Community Renewal.
However, the system has several problems. For one,
tenants do not receive a receipt or notice that their rent has
been paid. Since direct vendor takes the process of rent
payment out of the hands of the tenant, some families believe,
wrongly, that they are not responsible if a problem occurs.
Many are shocked to receive a rent arrears notice or
dispossess, when they thought their rent had been paid all
along. Notes one recent report citing the problems with
direct vendor payment, "However disturbing an eviction notice
is for a settled family, the trauma is magnified for families
who have recently escaped homelessness."6 Logistical snafus
are particularly high in Mitchell-Lama developments because of
the size of the housing companies, many collecting rent for
several developments constituting thousands of apartments. In
addition, some managers have had little experience with
tenants who receive public assistance. They may require the
entire month's rent at the beginning of the month, a problem
for tenants on HRA's bimonthly system, resulting in regular
late-rent notices to the tenant. Or they may hold on to
security or last month's rent checks without cashing them,
causing the checks to go "stale" and the tenant to have to
again renegotiate rent with her welfare caseworker. Finally,
many families resent that they are "not trusted" with paying
their own rent, particularly in light of the number of
problems caused by direct vendor payment. They reason that if
they were responsible enough to be selected for the IDFP, then
they should be responsible enough to pay and monitor their own
rent.
Other causes of rent arrears included: errors on the part
of management (17.1 percent, n=6); problems with the Section 8
payments (8.6 percent, n=3); and tenants who mistakenly think
they are on direct vendor, but are not (because of an
administrative error), and so spend their rent money on other
things (8.6 percent, n=3). This last scenario is plausible
because of the way a client's welfare budget is readjusted on
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moving to permanent housing. Specifically, when a family
leaves the shelter, its budget is readjusted: "restaurant
allowance," a benefit for homeless families without cooking
facilities at their shelter, is removed from their budget and
rent is added. A client not aware of these changes could
easily mistake her rent for restaurant allowance, as it comes
in one lump sum.
Of the nineteen families who experienced rent arrears,
six received a dispossess or a 10-day notice. (A dispossess,
as I noted earlier, is a non-payment eviction notice from the
city's housing court, while a 10-day notice is a letter of
intent from management which precedes the filing in housing
court.) In all, 17.1 percent of the case study population
experienced this more severe form of rent arrears. However,
in no case during the study period did this problem result in
eviction.
Rent problems surfaced on average 4.4 months after the
tenant took occupancy. This does not mean that the arrears,
whatever its cause, began at that time, but rather that the
tenant or the caseworker was alerted to it then. In most
cases, the problem originated at the time of move-in.
Families received a- dispossess or 10-day notice on average 6.9
months into their tenancy. For those cases in which the rent
problem was resolved during the case record period (n=4), it
required, on average, 1.9 months from onset to resolution of
the problem.
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b) Public Assistance Problems
The second most common problem reported in the case
records was difficulties related to public assistance.
Seventeen families (48.6 percent) experienced at least one
public assistance problem during the study period (Table 4.3).
Of course, all families on welfare encounter some
difficulties during their period of assistance. A recent
survey of welfare recipients found that 44.5 percent
experienced at least one case closing during their entire
history of assistance; as many as 23.5 percent experienced a
case closing in the last two years.7 Many fall prey to
"churning," a practice whereby the welfare agency attempts to
"clear its rolls" by periodically closing welfare cases for
administrative reasons.8 The form this took in New York City
was the mailing of a "survey" to recipients several times a
year. While the information requested in the form was
unimportant, if the survey was not returned to the agency, the
client's welfare case would be closed. This practice was
recently abolished in the city, because of its possible
contribution to family instability and homelessness.
Families moving from shelters to permanent housing, and
particularly the IDFP participants because of the special
handling of their cases, are especially prone to
administrative problems with their cases. Typically, when a
7 Knickman and Weitzman 22.
8 Kozol 103.
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Table 4.3--Summary of Public Assistance Problems
Description % of # of Avg. Avg.
Cases Cases Time For Time To
Problem Resolve
To
Surface
Budget Incorrect 25.7% 9 ---- ----
No Medicaid 14.3% 5 ---- ----
Recoupment 11.4% 4 ---- ----
Case Closing 11.4% 4 ---- ----
Sanctioning 5.7% 2 ---- ----
Total With PA Problems 48.6% 17 2.9 2.1
(excluding overlap) * Months Months
Total + 100% 35 ---- 
----
percent experiencing at least one public assistance problem
+ Does not sum to 100 percent because of multiple problems
reported
Source: Analysis by author of data from the Involuntarily Displaced
Families Program supplied by the New York State Division of Housing
and Community Renewal.
family moves from a shelter to permanent housing, several
actions are supposed to occur. First, after bringing an
apartment lease to her income maintenance worker, the client
is supposed to receive checks for first and last month's rent
and security and for emergency furniture. The caseworker is
supposed to make a note of the move-in date, so that she knows
when to change the client's address on the case record and
readjust the budget, as described earlier. Finally, if rent
is to be paid direct vendor, the caseworker must fill-out a
form which sets this process in motion.
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These steps are seldom performed correctly or in a timely
fashion by the income maintenance worker, who carries a
caseload of as many as two hundred clients. 9 In the case
study population, 25.7 percent (n=9) reported instances where
their budget either had not been readjusted or had been
adjusted incorrectly. Others experienced difficulty obtaining
Medicaid coverage (14.3 percent, n=5), or weathered a case
closing (11.4 percent, n=4) or recoupment (a reduction in
benefits because of an overpayment or because the client
misspent agency money)(11.4 percent, n=4). Finally, 5.7
percent of families (n=2) were "sanctioned" by HRA during the
case record period, resulting in a reduction in benefits.
Sanctioning is a punitive measure applied to clients who do
not follow administrative procedures, for example, refusing to
attend a workfare program when it is mandated.
Obviously, there is some overlap in these percentages.
If a worker fails to readjust a client's budget and the client
unknowingly spends that portion of the grant for which they
are no longer eligible (such as restaurant allowance), then
the client is eventually recouped, and so experiences two
problems. Of the seventeen families who encountered
administrative difficulties with public assistance, five (14.3
percent of the surveyed client population) experienced two
problems and one (2.9 percent) experienced three problems.
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These problems surface on average 2.9 months after a
family takes occupancy, with 35.2 percent of the difficulties
(n=6) coming to light in the first month. Like rent arrears,
public assistance problems take time to resolve. Of those
cases with problems which were settled during the follow-up
period (n=6), it required on average 2.1 months from onset to
the resolution of the problem.
Reading the case records, one senses the frustration of
both recipients and caseworkers in trying to ascertain what
went wrong, and who is to blame. In one example, staff of the
State Department of Social Services process the rent and
furniture checks for participants in order to expedite the
move-out and avoid contact with HRA, which they view as
mistake-prone. (This direct client contact is a very unusual;
the state agency generally assists clients indirectly through
a local social service provider.) However, the result of good
intentions is additional confusion. Sometimes the city worker
is left in the dark about the client's whereabouts, and so
does not change the client's address or readjust her budget.
The service providers I spoke with thought that IDFP
participants experience more problems with public assistance
than other clients because of this added complexity, despite
the additional help from the state.
c) Lack of Furniture
Many caseworkers noted that their families require
additional furniture. In all, 34.3 percent of the cases
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(n=12) included this comment. This does not mean that
families required "essential" pieces, such as beds or a
kitchen table, but rather that their client's apartments
seemed bare. Only 5.7 percent of the cases (n=2) noted the
need for additional beds (Table 4.4).
Most families leave their belongings behind when they
enter the shelter system, or have little to begin with. And
the HRA grant to refurnish an apartment is woefully
insufficient. A family usually moves into an apartment with
little more than the required beds and a kitchen set. Notes
one rehousing study,
Furniture [is] another systemic problem that especially
work[s] against the fragile transitional process for
formerly homeless families. Calculated by room, welfare
furniture allowances range from $182 for a living room to
$6 for a bathroom, clearly insufficient for purchasing
well-made, sturdy pieces. Sofa acquired by several
families had protruding springs and stuffing; chairs had
broken legs. While any family would be disappointed if
its new furniture arrived in disrepair, the effect is
even more troubling for a family that has gon 0without
its own furnishings for months or even years.
Perhaps the lack of furniture is more apparent for IDFP
tenants because of the size of most Mitchell-Lama apartments,
designed originally for middle-income tenants. One caseworker
described her client as "rattling around" in her large,
sparsely furnished apartment.
d) Health Problems
About a third of the families (34.3 percent, n=12)
experienced some illness during the case record period. If
106
10 Notkin 30.
pregnancy is included as a factor, then 37.1 percent (n=13) of
families experienced health difficulties. Three families (8.6
percent) witnessed births during this period.
In coding the monthly reports, I distinguished between
"major" health incidents or conditions, such as a stroke,
cancer or complications during pregnancy, and "minor"
incidents or conditions, such as chronic asthma. In all, 14.3
percent of families (n=5) experienced major illnesses and 20
percent (n=7) experienced minor health difficulties during the
case record period.
Families living in poverty suffer from more chronic and
acute illness than the general population. For those who have
experienced bouts of homelessness, the contrast is even more
severe.11 A study of sixty formerly-homeless families
conducted by the Settlement Housing Fund in New York City
found that almost half the households surveyed reported a
health condition of one or more family members which required
on going medical attention. Over 30 percent of the families
reported children who suffered from asthma. And 23 percent of
the adult heads of families had a chronic health condition
which required on going medical attention. Several adults
suffered from hypertension. Other illnesses included
arthritis, lupus, anemia, heart disease, headaches, backaches
and emphysema.12
11 Bassuk, et. al. (eds.), Chap. 7.
12 Settlement Housing Fund 20-21.
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e) Depression
A number of the case records referred to families as
being "depressed" or "lonely". As I mentioned above, I do not
know whether this is a casual reference to someone who is
"feeling down," or if this represents something more severe,
such as clinically-defined depression. (Since most caseworkers
are not professionally-trained social workers, they are not
qualified to make such a diagnosis in any case.) I only note
it here because it appeared as a pattern in the records.
Twenty percent of families (n=7) were labeled "depressed" or
"lonely" during the case record period.
The incidence of this condition was most common during
the first two months of occupancy, with three cases cited, and
on average occurred three months into tenancy.
f) Repair Problems
Finally, repairs were cited by caseworkers as a common
problems during the follow-up period. Twenty percent (n=7) of
families experienced some problem with their apartment, with
most of these (n=5) being minor, such as a leaky faucet or
missing baseboard. Only 5.7 percent of families (n=2)
experienced what I categorized as "major" repair problems,
which included lack of heat and serious water damage from a
ceiling leak. In all cases, the condition was not caused by
the tenant and was quickly responded to by management.
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Table 4.4--Commonly Reported Problems
Description
Rent
Public Asst.
Furniture
Lacks Beds
Health Problems
Major Illness
Minor Illness
Pregnancy
Depression
Repairs
Major
Minor
Substance/Alcohol Abuse
Domestic Violence
Unauthorized Sub-tenant
Truancy
All Problems (excluding
overlap)*
"Major" Problems
(excluding overlap)*
68.6% 24
Total + 100% 35
percent experiencing at least one as
cited in Appendix Two
+ does not sum to 100 percent because of multiple problems
reported
Source: Analysis by author of data from the Involuntarily
Displaced Families Program supplied by the New York State
Division of Housing and Community Renewal.
g) Other Problems
A number of other problems were cited, but none in enough
frequency to be treated as a separate category.
Noticeably missing from the above list is a panoply of
psychosocial problems generally associated with the homeless:
child abuse, domestic violence, alcohol and substance abuse
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% of Cases # of Cases
54.3% 19
48.6% 17
34.3% 12
5.7% 2
34.3% 12
14.3% 5
20% 7
8.6% 3
20% 7
20% 7
5.7% 2
14.3% 5
5.7% 2
5.7% 2
2.6% 1
11.4% 4
94.3% 33
and other mental health problems. The incidence of client-
precipitated problems was relatively small. Only 5.7 percent
of families (n=2) were cited by caseworkers as having members
who were suspected alcohol or substance abusers. Incidents of
harassment by a significant other were equally uncommon (5.7
percent, n=2). A problem often cited by managers in rehousing
programs is that of overcrowding or the appearance of an
unauthorized subtenant (usually a boyfriend). But, that only
surfaced once (2.6 percent) in the reports. There were no
reports of families damaging their apartment or picking fights
with neighbors (though two clients [5.7 percent] reported
feeling harassed by other tenants). Finally, truancy, a result
of a child not being enrolled in school or attending school
irregularly, was reported in only four cases (11.4 percent).
How do we explain this near absence of social problems in
the families observed? Surely, it is partly the result of
effective screening by service providers. Few "problem
families" were referred to the IDFP. Another possible
explanation is that it takes more than six or eight months for
problems to appear. Perhaps if we returned in two years, we
would record another story entirely. Given my interviews with
families who have been in place for a year and a half to two
years, and the near absence of recidivism, discussed below, I
think this explanation is unlikely. The period of initial
occupancy is the most stressful. As one caseworker observed,
"everything begins to happen in the first three
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months.. .that's when the oil separates from water." A study
by the Settlement Housing Fund, cited earlier, noted that of
those families who experienced difficulties in housing, "for
the most part these occurred early in tenancy."13 One final
explanation might be that caseworkers are not reporting the
personal problems experienced by family members to the DHCR.
Perhaps caseworkers feel obliged to protect the
confidentiality of their clients, or alternately to protect
the reputation of the agency, which after all referred the
family. I find this scenario more plausible. The DHCR staff
repeatedly express frustration that when problems do surface,
often through a complaint from management, it appears that the
tenant has been experiencing the difficulties for a long time.
They reason that the service provider should have noticed this
if they were indeed visiting the family. I suspect that there
are more personal problems experienced by families than are
reported in the case records, but that they are generally
resolved without coming to the attention of management or the
agency.
h) Summary
Few families were spared problems in the first months of
rehousing. Of the thirty-five families for which case records
were available, only two (5.7 percent) encountered no
difficulties during the follow-up period (Figure 4.4). The
average number of problems per family was 3.5; however, the
13 Settlement Housing Fund 3.
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distribution is bi-modal with 25.7 percent of families (n=9)
experiencing either no or one problem, and another 48.3
percent (n=18) experiencing between four and six problems.
This stands to reason since some of the problems, as I noted,
have a "domino effect": a case closing leads to rent arrears
which results in the receipt of a dispossess; or an illness
leads to feelings of depression or children missing days of
school.
Figure 4.4--Frequency of Problems
Source: Analysis by author of data from the Involuntarily Displaced
Families Program supplied by the New York State Division of Housing
and Community Renewal.
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About 30 percent of the problems recorded (38 of the 125
problems) fall into the category of "major" problems. These
include the receipt of a dispossess, a welfare case closing, a
major illness or other difficulties of a similar magnitude
(See Appendix Two). As many as 68.6 percent of families
(n=24) encountered at least one of these more serious
problems. Of these, most (37.1 percent, n=13) only
experienced one major problem, while a smaller number
encountered two (22.8 percent, n=8) or three (8.6 percent,
n=3).
I do not know what the cumulative effect of these
problems is on families. Certainly, the resettlement process
is stressful enough without having to worry each day about
receiving a dispossess or a notice of case closing. These
problems impede the family's attempts to settle; they make the
"permanent" housing seem less permanent. As a caseworker
complained in a report to the state, these problems constitute
"a kind of psychological warfare" against the client.
I believe the above problems take their toll, even on a
population as motivated as the IDFP participants. Some may
defer a dream of returning to school or taking a job while
they fight to preserve the little stability they have. Others
may decide not to get "too attached" to their apartments.
They may respond by laying only shallow roots; refusing to
make friends or familiarize themselves with a neighborhood;
113
neglecting the small improvements which make an apartment a
home.
The problems have not resulted in a new cycle of
homelessness for participants. I think this portrays both the
perseverance of families and the quality of the follow-up
service they receive--a topic discussed next.
Follow-up by Not-For-Profit Agencies
a) Were the Visits Performed?
When the Tier II shelter refers a family to the IDFP, it
enters into an informal contract with the state: in return for
the high-quality apartments offered through the program,
shelters agree to provide follow-up assistance to their
clients. Specifically, they agree to visit families in the
following sequence after move-out:
* Bi-weekly visits in the first month of occupancy;
* Monthly visits during the second through sixth month
of occupancy; and,
* Future visits on an "as needed" basis.14
Apart from setting this mandated number of visits, neither the
DSS nor the DHCR established any guidelines for what was to
occur during these visits. The DHCR encouraged caseworkers to
introduce themselves to managers at developments--to make
their presence known--and the DSS developed a monthly report
form to record the visits (Appendix 3). The form reminds
workers to verify that children are registered in school and
to "indicate any problems which might affect tenancy, such as
14 NYS/DSS, Memo Regarding Screening Criteria and Follow-
up, 1988.
114
health, PA grant, building maintenance, etc., and what action
is being taken to resolve the same". 15 But apart from vague
suggestions, shelter providers were left to structure the
visits as they saw appropriate.
As I noted earlier, shelter providers are limited in the
amount of follow-up service they are able to provide. Several
of the larger agencies have been awarded grants from the state
for follow-up programs, but most shelters receive no
additional funding to provide these visits. Often a
caseworker or housing worker in a shelter is expected to wear
a second hat, splitting time between current residents of a
shelter and former clients now in permanent housing around the
city. In addition, shelter agencies have questioned the
mandated number of visits, particularly when less capable
families in poorer quality permanent housing receive less
attention as a result. Notes one provider, "I guess it makes
sense that the state is saying we'd like you to provide
support. But what is not sensible is to say across the board
that every family in the program has to have follow-up". 16
As a response to this criticism (and, as will follow, to the
fact that many Tier II shelters were not conducting the
required number of visits), the state recently reduced the
visit schedule. The new sequence is: three visits in the
15 NYS/DSS, "IDFP Monthly NFP Report" form, 1988.
16 Jack Doyle, Coordinator, Services for the Homeless,
American Red Cross of Greater New York chapter, quoted in Glazer
21.
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first three months followed by a closing visit in month six.
(This change was made in late-1990, and so does not affect the
study population who all have been in permanent housing for at
least six months.)
Figure 4.5 provides a breakdown of the number of visits
which were performed per client. Visits are bi-modally
distributed, with 32 percent of the families (n=16) receiving
no visits at all and 44 percent of the families (n=22)
receiving four to six visits. Only 2 percent of the IDFP
participants received the state's mandated seven visits during
the case record period. 1 7 In total, 168 reports were filed
for the fifty case families. Subtracting the visits in which
the client was not home (n=17) or in which the contact
occurred by phone (n=19), there were in 134 in-person visits,
or an average of 2.68 visits per client.
Many of the families were visited for a portion of the
mandated period, but then the visits were suspended and the
case was never officially closed. Of those families who
received at least one visit (n=34) only 44.1 percent (n=15)
received services to the time of case closure. From case
opening to closing, the average length of services was 5.9
months for this group. I suspect that many cases were not
closed because of staff turnover at shelters resulting in
17 I am assuming that if no case record was mailed to the
state, then the visit was not performed. There are alternative
explanations: 1) that a visit was made but that the paperwork
was not sent or 2) that a visit was made and a report filed, but
that it was lost by the state.
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Figure 4.5--Visits Per Client
Source: Analysis by author of data from the Involuntarily Displaced
Families Program supplied by the New York State Division of Housing
and Community Renewal.
services being suspended, or because the provider .intended to
visit the family again, but was never able to do so.
b) What Occurred During Follow-up Visits?
In contrast with the scenario provided by families in the
last chapter, caseworkers assisted clients in a variety of
ways during the case record period. The categories of
assistance mentioned most often in the reports are client
advocacy and the distribution of information (Figure 4.6).
Caseworkers performed some form of advocacy for 48.6
percent of the families (n=17). This comes as no surprise
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given the number of institutional problems experienced by
families. Many caseworkers I spoke with felt they did their
most effective work as advocates--freeing up a delayed welfare
check, straightening out a rent arrears problem or petitioning
for repairs. Often a simple telephone call from a provider
could affect change when the family's two weeks of work had
led nowhere. Of those case reports which mentioned the
performance of some form of advocacy, 35 percent (n=7) were
related to public assistance problems and 30 percent (n=6)
were related to rent problems. The remaining cases of
advocacy services were for repair problems (15 percent, n=3),
help with obtaining day care (10 percent, n=2) and with
finding more furniture (10 percent, n=2).
A second form of assistance was providing information to
rehoused families. Often this preceded the move to permanent
housing: many shelters supplied families with written
information about their new neighborhood, such as the phone
number of the local police precinct and the location of the
nearest community health facility. Some 40 percent of
families (n=14) received some form of information from a not-
for-profit agency once in housing. Of those case reports
which mentioned this assistance, 73 percent (n=ll) were for
requests information on education and training programs and 20
percent (n=3) for information on neighborhood services.
Other forms of intervention included monitoring a
family's behavior--visiting management to check on a family's
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Figure 4.6--Types of Intervention
Source: Analysis by author of data from the Involuntarily Displaced
Families Program supplied by the New York State Division of Housing
and Community Renewal.
rent and inquire about complaints or telephoning a child's
school to confirm attendance. In all, 28.6 percent (n=10) of
the families were monitored in some way by their caseworker.
Finally, caseworkers recorded instances of providing direct
counseling to clients or of arranging referrals to programs.
Seventeen percent of families (n=6) received some form of one-
on-one counseling from their caseworker and 11.4 percent (n=4)
were given referrals for
programs such as day care and specialized counseling.
119
Given this array of services, it is interesting to note
that many families received little or no assistance from their
caseworker. Of the thirty-five families who were visited,
nineteen or 54.3 percent received no or only one intervention
by a caseworker. A smaller group received four or more
interventions (20 percent, n=7).
While interviewing families, I discovered that many
remembered the home visits as social calls--an opportunity to
catch up on events at the shelter or to show the caseworker
the new home improvements they have made. This social
function served by the visit is extremely important, and it is
poorly measured by the above analysis.
Family Activities
In designing the IDFP, agency officials had expressed
hope that, living in better housing among working people,
participants would soon take important steps towards leaving
the welfare system: returning to school, entering a training
program or working.
However, the record of participants' first six to eight
months in permanent housing is mixed. Only one participant
has left the welfare system entirely. Fewer than half the
households have a member who is participating in any activity:
part-time work, school, training or volunteering in the
community. And, most families (54.3 percent, n=19) are not
yet involved in any program or activity outside the home
(Figure 4.7).
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These results should not be surprising, given the number
of problems families encounter during the process of
resettling. If a participant continually faces case closings
and eviction notices, she is much less likely to take on new
responsibilities until these problems are resolved. As I
discussed in Chapter Three, the settlement process takes time-
-longer perhaps then either families or caseworkers
anticipate. Of the families I interviewed, most required a
year or longer to begin work or self-sufficiency programs.
Figure 4.7--Client Participation in Work or Programs
Source: Analysis by author of data from the Involuntarily Displaced
Families Program supplied by the New York State Division of Housing
and Community Renewal.
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And yet, 45.7 percent of clients did begin some activity
during the case record period. I do not have comparison
figures for the level of participation in programs of all
public assistance recipients, but this percentage seems high.
a) Work
Twenty percent of families (n=7) participated in some
paid work in their first six to eight months in housing. Of
these, most (85.7 percent, n=6) worked at low-paying jobs with
part-time or irregular hours. Only one IDFP participant
worked full-time hours, and this at a position--public school
monitor--which she had held prior to her bout of homelessness.
Those who tried to mix work and welfare soon discovered
that the combination resulted in "the worst of both worlds."
Many soon found their welfare cases closed, even when the
level of their earnings should not have resulted in closure.
Of the six families working at low-paying part-time or
irregular positions, two experienced case closings and one had
her budget recouped and was threatened by her Income
Maintenance worker with fraud as a result of work. As one
leading expert on public assistance notes:
A woman is crazy to try and work part of the time and
stay home with her children part of the time. She gets
into even more hassles with the welfare system (because
she must constantly report her earnings); she must
arrange for day care; and she must cope with work,
children, and sometimes several forms of welfare. Her
reward for all of this is a tiny augunt of extra income
and often less medical protection.
18 David T. Ellwood, Poor Support: Poverty in the American
Family (New York: Basic Books, 1988) 142.
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Because of the loss of welfare benefits and the
uncertainty of part-time or irregular work, most left their
jobs within a short time. Of the seven working families, four
gave up their jobs during the case record period. The average
duration of this work was only 39 days.
b) Education and Training
A larger number participated in some form of school or
training during the case record period. In all, nine families
(25.7 percent) were enrolled in a variety of self-sufficiency
programs. This included five members of households enrolled
in Graduate Equivalency Diploma (GED) study, one in community
college and three in job training programs. Some families
entered programs in order to comply with HRA regulation.
(Under the terms of the Family Support Act of 1988, adult
heads of household with children three years or older must
participate in some work or training in order to receive their
welfare benefits.)
c) Volunteering
Finally, 8.6 percent (n=3) of families volunteered in
some organization outside the home during the case record
period. This included one family who was active with her
tenants association, another who donated time at her child's
Headstart program and a woman who returned to her former
shelter to teach an aerobics class.
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d) Summary
Two observations arise from this brief discussion of
family activities. The first is that starting new work or
programs takes time; our expectations of what families can
accomplish should be adjusted accordingly. On average,
families required 3.2 months to begin their first activity
after moving. However, the onset of new activities is bi-
modally distributed with a small number of families continuing
the activity that they participated in while at the shelter
after moving to permanent housing, and a larger number
requiring four to five months to begin their first activity.
For some families, turning on phone service or finding the
local health care center is an immense achievement. Perhaps
we should find ways of celebrating these small incremental
improvements in families' lives, rather than focusing on work
or programs. As I mentioned, the majority of participants
(54.3 percent), did not begin any formal work, education or
training during the case record period.
The second observation about work and self-sufficiency
programs is that participants seem to skip from activity to
activity without staying at one position for any length of
time. Five of the sixteen above families began more than one
out-of-home activity during the case record period--switching,
for instance, from a GED program to job training or leaving a
part-time job to return to school. Three others left the work
or program in which they were participating without beginning
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another activity during the follow-up period. As one
researcher on education and training programs notes, "leaving
welfare is a process not an event".1 9 It may entail false
starts and periodic setbacks. For many of the women
represented, the lack of family or friends in the immediate
neighborhood created additional obstacles. A sudden illness
or an informal child care arrangement falling through was
often enough to topple a family's attempts at becoming self-
sufficient.
4.4 Recidivism
But, while families exhibited limited success at
beginning new activities, evidence suggests that the
apartments and buildings in which they live contribute to
their overall stability. Of the fifty IDFP participants
studied here, forty-nine still reside in their apartments
after an average of two years in housing, according to the
DHCR logs. 20 This occupancy rate of 98 percent (or 2 percent
19 Toby Herr, Robert Halpern and Aimee Conrad, "Changing
What Counts: Rethinking the Journey Out of Welfare," an
unpublished paper by the Center for Urban Affairs and Policy
Research, Northwestern University, January 1991.
20 The one client no longer in place was evicted for non-
payment of rent according to management. However, case records
make note of the adult head of household being harassed by her
significant other. In the final record, the caseworker
encouraged the tenant to obtain an Order of Protection against
the boyfriend. It is possible that the tenant fled the
apartment for safety reasons.
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turnover) is astoundingly high for a rehousing program.
While comparisons have limited validity, because of
differences in screening procedures, quality housing and
follow-up services in individual rehousing programs, several
recent studies report identical turnover rates--approximately
85 percent--for their case populations. Four separate
rehousing studies, representing formerly-homeless families in
three different parts of the country, describe this same rate
of turnover.21 I do not know what this means, except that
most homeless families given the opportunity remain in the
housing in which they are placed. Inevitably there is some
percentage of families who experience difficulties--perhaps 15
percent is a good baseline figure.
The 2 percent rate of turnover for the IDFP may be
somewhat understated. As I suggested in the last chapter, the
communication between housing managers and the agency is poor.
The managers I interviewed did not believe that they were
required to notify the agency if an IDFP participant moved or
was evicted. However, since most families receive a state
Section 8 rent subsidy, they are visited yearly by the DHCR
for recertification. Presumably, unreported move-outs would
turn up then. Also, since a family threatened with eviction
might contact their former caseworker, the agency might hear
of turnover through a not-for-profit shelter. Even if
managers had overlooked two or three families no longer in
21 See Guzman; Long; Klein; and Herzog.
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place, the percentage still in housing remains high.
What explains this stability of IDFP participants?
Certainly the screening by service providers and the quality
of the housing play a part. Which factor exerts more of an
influence is unclear. I believe the experimental nature of
this rehousing program and the independent monitoring of
families by the DSS, the DHCR and the service providers is
another important factor. While, as we learned in this
chapter, families experienced a multitude of problems after
relocation, no one "fell through the cracks." Often, the news
of a problem--a child not attending school, a family behind on
their rent--sent shock waves through the bureaucracy, leading
to conference calls, memos and commitments of follow-up by a
service provider. The fact that so many individuals--from
state commissioners to line staff at the DHCR and DSS--have a
vested interest in making the program "work" has resulted,
predictably, in fewer families losing their apartments, at
least to "preventable" problems, such as rent arrears.
However, low turnover does not mean that the psychosocial
problems which may have led to a family becoming homeless have
been solved, only that they are not so severe so as to lead to
the family losing their new residence. Some participants, as
I suggested in the last chapter, are lonely or feel
overwhelmed in their new housing. Their prospects for
beginning activities outside the home, such as work or skills
training, are marginal. And, their inventory of social
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supports--a friend to talk to, a neighbor to help out in a
time of crisis--is limited. That the family is still in place
then is only a limited victory.
In the conclusion, I recommend a number of service
interventions designed to assist families in reintegrating
into neighborhoods and strengthening their informal supports.
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Conclusion
In this study, I have used a variety of research
methods--historical analysis, case study, content analysis--to
examine and evaluate one rehousing program.
Among the housing options available to families living in
shelters, the IDFP is an anomaly. The program openly "creams"
the shelter population, accepting only the most responsible or
"housing-ready" families. The program places families in
relatively economically-integrated buildings. Participants
are repeatedly told that they are special for having been
selected. They receive follow-up assistance by service
providers. Finally, the state has assigned line-level staff
to monitor the program's operation and respond quickly to
problems. The state should be complemented for its leadership
in crafting a model rehousing program.
For most families, living in this housing has affected
their lives in profound ways. Women report feeling "more in
control" of their lives and better able to act as a positive
role model for their children. Most are optimistic about the
future, and have realistic plans of things they hope to
accomplish. All hold firmly to the stability they have
created: making small home improvements with meager resources;
monitoring rent perhaps more vigilantly than neighboring
tenants.
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For me, the experience of interviewing families was quite
heartening. Having been employed for several years as a
relocation worker, I was moved by families' descriptions of
what permanent housing meant to them.
Still, a number of findings in the study are troubling:
* Many families are plagued by problems out of their
control, such as rent arrears and welfare case closings.
The average number of problems per family was 3.5. As
many as 68 percent of families suffered from at least one
"major" problem.
* Some participants have difficultly establishing supports
in their new communities. While the social isolation I
observed had not yet affected their tenancy, it prevented
participants from feeling "settled" in their apartments
or from beginning new activities.
* Many families are not receiving follow-up assistance.
Thirty-two percent of families received no visits at all.
Less than half of participants (44 percent, 15 of 35)
received visits for the mandated six month period.
In the following section, I make a number of
recommendations intended to address the above problems and
improve the IDFP.
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Recommendations
Assist Families In Establishing Linkages In Their New
Communities
The DSS and DHCR should investigate the Family Support
Center, described in Chapter Three, as a model of service
delivery to rehoused families. In addition, the agencies
should consider contracting services with providers in
the neighborhoods where families are concentrated.
Encourage Housing Companies To Provide More Formal And
Informal Support To Families
Since the inception of the Mitchell-Lama program in the
1950s, the tenant composition of many of the developments
has changed. Families have less income, relative to
their earlier counterparts, and they bring with them more
problems, such as drug and alcohol addiction and family
violence. Managers require training to respond to this
changing tenant population. The IDFP participants as
well as other tenants would benefit from additional
services. This might take the form of informal
counseling and referral to service professionals in the
community, "welcome wagons" for incoming tenants,
apartment orientations, community services directories
and support for the work of tenants associations and
other voluntary groups.
Move Families, When Possible And Practical, To Their
Neighborhood Of Origin
Surely, it would be impractical to attempt to refer every
applicant to the neighborhood where they once lived.
Some families do not want to return to their neighborhood
of origin. Some have experienced so much dislocation in
their lives that there is no neighborhood that they
strongly identify with. However, for those families that
do have someplace they can call home, rehousing them in
their neighborhood of origin would provide important
social supports and help to stabilize families after long
periods of dislocation.
Train Families While At The Shelter To Anticipate
Institutional Problems
Families should know what their readjusted public
assistance budget will look like. They should have
enough familiarity with housing court and with their
rights as tenant to protect themselves. Given that many
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of the problems that families experience cannot be
prevented, service providers should provide more
information and skills training to families while still
living in temporary housing.
Allow IDFP Participants To Pay Their Own Rent
The tenant's share of rent is relatively small: of the
mean total rent, which is $586, the tenant's share (that
not covered by the Section 8 contribution) is $146, or 25
percent of the total. Given the number of problems that
families experience with the direct vendor system,
families should be trusted to budget for and pay this
small amount on their own. The agency should fall back on
direct vendor only as a last resort, with those unable to
assume the responsibility of rent payment.
Provide Additional Training For Caseworkers, Both At
Anticipating Institutional Problems And At Working More
Effectively With Clients
Small gestures by caseworkers--walking with a family
around their new neighborhood; introducing a client to
another who lives in same building--make an enormous
difference for some families. The agencies should
provide a forum for sharing these service strategies. In
addition, caseworkers should receive training in order to
be better advocates for their clients. Many of the
institutional problems, related to welfare entitlements,
tracking down missing rent checks or obtaining day care,
cannot ,be resolved without some knowledge of the rules
governing these programs. Finally, workers should have
more guidance from the agencies on how to fill out case
records. The quality of reporting is very uneven.
Improve The Monitoring Of The IDFP
The data collected by the state would be invaluable in a
future study of families' success in housing. The
agencies should standardize the case record process.
They should also require housing companies to improve
their reporting on current participants.
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Future Research
Like many of the rehousing studies I review in Chapter
One, this study is limited by a small sample size, a short
time frame (families only in housing for on average two years)
and a relatively informal process of data gathering. The
families I interviewed were not chosen randomly, but rather
were referred by service providers. My survey instrument
consisted of a small number of open-ended questions intended
to provoke conversation rather than answer a set of formal
study questions. In addition, analysis of the case records
was limited to the few topics addressed by caseworkers on the
form: problems, interventions and client activities.
However, the results of this research would be useful to
social researchers in designing future studies. The issues
which might be addressed in such a study would include:
* Social Networks--In order to substantiate the finding
that homeless families have difficulty establishing
friends and other supports after rehousing, researchers
might administer a psycholggical test, such as the Social
Support Network Inventory, to families and to a
control;
* Creaming--How do IDFP participants differ from others in
the homeless system? How far can the IDFP "dip" into the
homeless population before families are referred who
exhibit severe psychosocial problems? Researchers might
address these questions by repeating the methodology used
1 J. Flaherty, FM Gaviria and D Pathak, "The Measurement
of Social Support: The Social Support Network Inventory," Compr
Psychiatry 24 (1983): 521 as cited in Bassuk and Rosenberg 787.
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in the NYU homeless study2 on a sample of IDFP
participants and comparing the results;
* Impact of Institutional Problems--Do the problems which
families experience in housing, such as rent arrears and
case closings, prevent families from settling? Are such
problems just a nuisance or a source of great stress?
Are some ways of responding to such problems more
"healthy" than others (for instance, families learning to
become their own advocates)? These questions might be
addressed in set of detailed survey questions.
In addition, the IDFP provides what social scientists
refer to as a natural experiment:3 families are referred at
random to apartments across the city. One area of future
research would be a study of the effects of living in
different types of housing or in different neighborhoods on a
family's performance. Does living in a middle-income setting
lead to other life improvements for low-income families, such
as parents leaving the welfare system or children doing better
in school? One recent study in Chicago of families from the
inner-city who moved to suburban neighborhoods, found that
suburban living had a profound impact on families, as compared
with an inner-city control.4 Would a family settling in the
South Bronx experience more problems in housing than another
who relocates to Forest Hills, Queens. Or conversely, would
families living in the middle-income setting feel isolated and
2 Knickman and Weitzman.
3 Babbie 268.
4 James E. Rosenbaum and Susan J. Popkin, "Economic and
Social Impacts of Housing Integration," A Report to the Charles
Stewart Moss Foundation (Grant #88-015), Center for Urban Affairs
and Policy Research, Northwestern University, March 1990.
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have more difficulty settling? What importance does race and
ethnicity play in resettlement?
These questions could be examined by matching data from
family interviews with data about the characteristics of
buildings in which families live and neighborhoods. Much of
this data on demographic and physical characteristics already
exists and would only have to be incorporated in a master
database, using addresses or census tracts as reference.
Finally, the families now in housing might be tracked
longitudinally, to examine the effects of rehousing over time.
How will families who participate in the IDFP compare in ten
years with families who were placed in other, less stable,
housing? The age-old question of the effect of physical
environment on personal well-being might be addressed in such
a study.
The information maintained by the DHCR would be
invaluable in carrying out such future research.
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Appendix One
d ODSS SCREENING CRITERIA
Screening Criteria for Homeless Families Referred to State
Assisted Housing Projects
* Families who have been in residence at the not-for-profit
run shelter for at least one month.
* Families who have exhibited no signs of substance & alcohol
abuse problems or any anti-social behavior and are ge-erally
in good health.
* Families who have kept their rooms at the shelter neat and
clean and have not taken part in any willful destruction of
their room or the shelter in general.
* Families whose children have not been problematic at the
facility.
* Families who agree to voluntarily restrict their rent as a
direct vendor payment - client choice to remove at any time.
(6 months to one year)
* Priority referral of families which contain members who
attend job training or educational training program.
Follow-up Procedures for Families placed in State Assisted
Housing Projects.
* Contact names for H.R.A. - Income Maintenance staff will be
provided to the management company to discuss any income
entitlements or rent payment problems.
* Contact names for the referral agency (family shelter) will
be provided to the management company to discuss any problem
families.
* An orientation to apartment living and to the community will
be provided to the families by the referral agency.
* Not-for-profit shelter staff will make a bi-weekly visits to
the families during the first month of occupancy.
* Monthly visits will be made by the referral agency during
months 2-6 of occupancy.
* Future visits will be made on an "as needed" basis.
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Appendix Two
Coding Sheet: Client Problems
Rent problems:
01 Section 8 not paying
02 Welfare not paying
03 Management error
04 Rent part of AFDC
budget w/o client
aware
05 Client at fault
06* Receives dispossess
07* Major illness
08 Minor illness
09 Pregnancy
10* Problem with spouse or
significant other
11* Suspected or alcohol
substance abuse
12 Depressed/lonely
13 Concerns about
neighborhood safety
14 Concerns about building
safety
15* Harassment by neighbors
16* Victim of crime
17* Children not enrolled in
school
18* Children attending school
irregularly
19 Difficulty obtaining
child care/kindergarten
20 Difficulty turning-on
phone
Public assistance
problems:
21* Case closing
22 Recoupment
23 Budget incorrect
24 Being sanctioned
25 Medicaid
26 Other
27 Apartment overcrowded
or unauthorized tenant
28 Minor repair problem
29* Major repair problem
30 Lacks furniture
31 Other problem
(*) Major Problems
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Coding Sheet: Caseworker Intervention:
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Monitoring of:
Rent
Children in school
Other
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Referral to:
Day care
Training/School
Counseling
Substance abuse
treatment
Other
Information about:
Neighborhood
services
Job Training/School
Other
Counseling:
Budgeting
Career planning
Family planning
Other
Advocacy re:
Repairs
Rent issues
Day care
Public assistance
Obtaining furniture
Other,
A" W dk6 "I'll, 11  - .11- 1 .. . 1 11 1 . .
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Coding Sheet:Client Activities:
Client working:
01 Full-time
02 Part-time
03 Irregular
Client volunteering at:
04 Tenants Association
05 School/Headstart
06 Other
07 Enrolls children
in day care/Headstart
08 Turns-on phone
09 Attending training program
Client in school studying:
10 GED
11 ESL
12 College
13 Other
14 Passes GED/graduates
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Appendix Three
Involuntarily Displaced Families Program Monthly IM Report
Family Name Move-in Date
NFP/Facility Name Visit Date
Name of development where family lives
Is this the final report? Yes. No
Are the children registered in school?Yes No If not,
state why in space below. Also indicate any problems which
might affect tenancy such as health, PA grant, "uilding
maintenance, etc. and what action is being take.i to resolve
same. If final report (at end of six months), indicate
needed follow-up action you would recommend for '-he family,
if any.
Name of individua- t ing this report
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Interviews
IDFP PARTICIPANTS
Interviews with eight families in their apartments, March
12-15, 1991.
NYS/DHCR
William Eimicke, former Commissioner, by phone, March 12,
1991.
NYS/DSS
Russell Oliver, Special Assistant on Homeless Issues,
Division of Income Maintenance, by phone, March 8,
1991.
Nancy Travers, former Assistant Commissioner, Office of
Shelter and Supported Housing, by phone, May 2,
1991.
HOUSING COMPANIES
Eileen Feigan, Manager, Grenadier Management Company, in
person, March 12, 1991.
Rosalyn Barrie, Manager, Castleton Park Apartments, by
phone, April 16, 1991.
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Linda Ramsey, Manager, Marcus Garvey Apartments, in
person, March 13, 1991.
SERVICE PROVIDERS
Mekonnen Abraha, Caseworker, American Red Cross of
Greater New York, by phone, April 11, 1991.
Francis Drayton, Assistant Director, Henry Street
Settlement, in person, March 14, 1991.
Elizabeth Harris, Caseworker, Hospitality House, by
phone, March 14, 1991.
Shirley Jones, Director of Relocation Services, Women In
Need, in person, January 29, 1991.
Diane Wagner, Caseworker, American Red Cross of Greater
New York, in person, January 31, 1991.
OTHERS
Dr. Ellen Bassuk, Researcher, by phone, April 9, 1991.
Joe Stillman, Conservation Corporation, by phone,
February 28, 1991.
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